Area of operations of 7 Guards Army and III Panzer Corps
Introduction
One of the major issues with the historiography of the Soviet-German War is that German accounts of the war had an almost unchallenged run for over forty years between 1945 and 1991. Former German generals found a willing audience in American soldiers and historians who were struggling to counter the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the prospect of a Third World War. The post war Foreign Military Studies Project of 1945-54 collected materials from captured German generals to work up into studies of the war and when combined with publication of numerous memoirs from FM. Erich v.Manstein downwards and popular histories from the likes of journalist Paul Carrel, the result of this activity was a tendency to skew Western views of the Soviet-German War towards a Germanocentric one. In the process, difficult subjects were ignored and disappeared and entire military operations sunk without trace. Since 1991 the release of Soviet documents, the activities of Russian and Russian speaking Western scholars has begun to swing the pendulum back towards the centre, however there continues to be a steady stream of one-sided German histories written and published by Western scholars.
The aim of this exercise is to demonstrate some of the problems with one-sided Germanicentric scholarship by examining one of those rare occurances, a divisional sized battle which has primary and secondary sources from both sides.
Battle of Melikhovo
6 Panzer Division penetrates the 2nd Belt defences at the Battle of Kursk
Gen Mikhail Shumilov
During the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, Army Detachment Kempf provided the flank guard for the main attack by the II SS Panzer Corps on the southern side of the bulge. The mission was to clear the eastern bank of the North Donets river and to drive the enemy back to the town of Korotscha. This would allow the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps to drive northwards along the western bank of the river to capture the town of Kursk. This important mission was given to three Panzer Divisions (6, 7 and 19) and the 168th Infantry Division backed up by other Infantry Divisions from Corp Raus. The SS Totenkopf Division would drive up the western bank of the North Donetz to maintain a continuous front.
Pz Gen Werner Kempf
They were facing a formidable task as the area was defended by the 7th Guards Army under the command of Lt Gen M. S. Shumilov. This was the former 62nd Army which had defended Stalingrad and Shumilov was a good Army commander who would command the Army for the rest of the war. The Army occupied strong defences along the line of the river and the outskirts of the city with the 81st and 78th Guards Rifle Divisions in the First Belt and the 73rd Guards Rifle Division in the Second Belt supported by 2 Tank Regiments and 2 SU Regiments. The 7th Guards Army was part of the Voronezh Front which had the 69th Army in reserve in the 3rd Belt and Front Reserves of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps and 2nd Guards Tank Corps in the area ready to support the 7th Guards Army. On the western bank of the North Donetz river the 6th Guards Army deployed the 375th Rifle Division, with the 89th Rifle Division and 96th Tank Brigade in reserve.
The point of interest is that Army Detachment Kempf would be pitting its panzers against a defence made up of Rifle Divisions backed up by infantry support tanks. The big Soviet armoured reserves would all be committed further west against II SS Panzer Corps’ attack.
The German Plan
The plan of attack was for the 6 Panzer Division to attack out of the Belgorod bridgehead along with the 168 Infantry Division and head along the line of the North Donetz river. The 19 Panzer Division would attack the southern part of Belgorod and the 7 Panzer Division would cross the river south of the city and clear the river bank before all three divisions headed along the east bank of the North Donetz river to Korotscha. The Soviet plan was to fight the Germans within each defensive Belt and to move reserves forward to reinforce the point of penetration. The reserves would include tanks, heavy AT guns and heavy artillery units to back up reserve Rifle Divsions. This would mean Rifle Divisions manoeuvring in front of Panzer Divisions but within a defensive belt they would be safe enough.
The opening moves of the Operation
Gen Hundersdorf
The start of the operation for the 6 Panzer on the 5 July was delayed when Soviet artillery fire destroyed the heavy bridge over the North Donetz which stopped the Tiger tanks of the attached company from 503 Abt from crossing. So the 168 Infantry was left to carry on alone and the 6 Panzer and its Tiger company moved south to cross the following day in the area of the 7 Panzer. The 19 Panzer had a hard day but failed to dislodge the 81st GRD which was well entrenched on the high ground on the east of the city. The 7 Panzer crossed the river and quickly over-ran the positions of the 78th GRD despite their fortifications. The 78th GRD held a flat flood plain along the river bank with hardly any cover and the only defensible places were villages, but these lay at the bottom of hollows and simply turned into traps.
The following day, the 6 July, saw the 19 Pz Div grinding forward against the 81st GRD who still held the eastern approaches of Belgorod. 7 Pz Div chased the 78th GRD across the flood plain but was brought up short by the wooded hills and ridges to the east of the plain. These heights were defended by the 73rd GRD supported by armour, Army level heavy artillery and 85mm AA guns. Over the next few days, the 7 Pz and supporting Infantry Divisions would batter against these defences but make no progress. The 6 Pz spent the day crossing the river and setting up their repair base in Generalkova. They then launched an attack against a State Farm on the hill above Sevryukovo in support of the 7 Pz Div, over-running a battalion from the 73rd GRD. However 3 tanks were damaged by mines and 8 by gunfire.
Maj Baake and officers of 6 Panzer Division
The 7 of July looked more hopeful for the German command. True the 19 Pz Div and 168 ID were still locked in fighting for Belgorod and on the other side of the river SS Totenkopf had failed to shift the 375th Rifle Division from its defences along the river. Also the 7 Pz Div was making no progress further eastwards but the 6 Pz Div was now available and a gap had opened in the Soviet defences between the 73rd GRD and the 81st GRD along the line of the river Rasumnaja. So that morning, the 6 Pz Div under General Hundersdorf launched attacks against the two villages on the river, to clear their way ahead, supported by air strikes. First the tanks captured Yastrebovo and then Sevryukovo, after crossing a minefield and rushing through AT fire from the 31st Anti-tank Brigade on the wooded hills above. The bridge at Sevryukovo was destroyed so the Pioneers started construction of 24 tonne bridge while the Pz Grenadiers crossed over and defended the crossing site on the far bank.
On the morning of the 8 July at 2am, 6 Pz Div starteds to cross the river. KG Bieberstein was to drive up the line of the river to capture State Farm Kalinina, while KG Von Oppeln was to drive along the high ground between the Rasumnaja and Donetz rivers and capture the villages of Melikhovo and Schljechewo. KG Unrein was to follow on behind while the Flammpanzers and light tanks were left to guard Sevryukovo and the crossing point.
19 Pz Div was still fighting to clear the villages to the east of Belgorod but KG Becker had got round behind Blishniaya Igumenka and was in a position to provide flank guard to KG Von Oppeln by attacking Delniaya Igemenka to the west of the line of advance. But KG Becker was now down to 15 tanks and has lost 13 of its 14 Tigers from the 2/503 Abt during the first days fighting. So it appears 1/503rd accompanied it in support. During the course of the day, 7 Pz Div would continue fighting the 73rd GRD but gradually handed this sector over to Infantry Divisions.
KG Von Oppeln advanced steadily until it came upon an anti-tank ditch dug between the State Farm Kalinina and the one at Postnikov. From this point on it came under sustained artillery and rocket fire from the west from 93rd Gun Artillery Regt (152mm), 1/193rd Artillery Regt (122mm)and the 97th Guards Mortar Regt behind Delmaia Igumenka and similar fire from the east from the 94th GRD positions on the heights on the other side of the Rasumnaja river. There the 161st Gun Artillery Regt (152mm) and 315th Guards Mortar Regt had a clear view of the plateau and the both KG Von Opplen and KG Bieberstein. The Pz Pioneers blew a crossing across the ditch and the Pz Grenadiers cleared away the Soviet light forces on the far side, but discovered two minefields on the far side which took time to clear. The two flanking KG were doing even worse. KG Bieberstein was pinned down by artillery fire in front of State Farm Kalinina which turned out to be held by a battalion from the 92rd Guards Rifle Division. The dominating heights on the far side of the river with its wooded hill crests provided the perfect position to control the river valley. On the other side, the attack by KG Becker against Postnikov and Delmaia Igumenka had stalled because the river valley was steep sided, boggy, filled with mines and the far side had been made into an antitank escarpment. The slopes above the farm were crowned by AT Strongpoint No1 and Delmaia Igumenka contained AT Strongpoint No 7 and AT Region No 3 on the hill to the north.
What happened next
Having set the scene, the question is what happened next? In order to understand this we have two source from the German side Jentz Panzertruppen vol 1 and Lodieu III Pz Corps at Kursk and two sources from the Soviet side, one a Soviet era source I have translated and a modern course Zamulin Forgotten Battle of the Kursk Salient: 7th Guards Army's Stand Against Army Detachment Kempf.
The challenge is can you discern the actual course of events? Use the comments box below and let me know what you think while we are all locked down with the Corvid-19 virus. How does the German account fit with the Soviet account? What do the German authors leave out of their accounts? Finally look at the daily strength of 6 Panzer Division and note the sudden fall. Is this an indication of what really happened.
Evidence downloads (click on the author to download pdf file):