Crossing the Dvina (Colourisation by Klimbim)

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES Volume 34 Issue 2 on 16 December 2021, See the final published article here: https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1990556 If you have access please click on this link to record your readership of this article.

‘Surprise is overwhelming’. The surprise of the attack is the key to success.

Abstract

David Glantz described the Soviet use of forward detachments as the ‘tip of the spear’ of a tank army; small, armored, heavily armed and fully motorized groups wending their way through the German defenses, avoiding contact and operating up to 50 km in advance of the main body. This article seeks to examine the other end, the ‘butt of the spear’: the mechanized corps which provided the mass of infantry required to defend the bridgehead at the end of the offensive. Although they contained a large number of vehicles, the scale of allocation was nothing like that of Western armies and, given wartime shortages, even these were not met. So how did the mechanized corps keep up on the long distance operations of late 1944? This article analyzes the mobility and logistics of mechanized corps during the campaigns of 1945. Using this example, it will seek to explain how the units operated as part of the larger tank armies, and how their use evolved during the earlier campaigns of 1943-44.

Introduction: the Role of mechanized corps and brigades

Like the Apostles, there were only ever 13 mechanized corps (Mekhanizirovannye Korpusa MK) and no more than a handful of separate mechanized brigades formed for the war against Germany.[2] These were the largest, most lavishly equipped divisional sized units in the entire Red Army, twice the size of the average rifle division and with more tanks and guns than a tank corps. They represented a considerable investment both in terms of personnel and equipment, as between them they required 200,000 personnel, 4,000 armored vehicles and 22,000 motor vehicles, which represented around 5% of the entire vehicle fleet.

The 47 mechanized brigades were largely formed into mechanized corps, three in each, except for 25 Mechanized Brigade (Mekhanizirovannye Brigada MB) which served with the 17th Army, 42 MB which served for the entire war in the Far East and the 46 & 47 MB which formed the Operational Motorized Group of the Kalinin Front (Operativnaîa motomekhanizirovannaîa gruppa Kalininskogo fronta). The mechanized corps operated as part of tank armies or as independent corps, usually forming the front reserve, utilizing their armor and mobility to react to local events quickly. Except for Operation Bagration in 1944, tank armies were not deployed in the northern half of Russia, so mechanized corps often fulfilled a similar role, spear-heading offensives such as in the Rzhev-Sychevsk Offensive Operation of November 1942 when 1, 2 and 3 MK led the left wing of the attack. Yet it is surprising to learn that these expensive units were only rarely used, spending large amounts of time in the Reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) or in the reserves of fronts, despite the fact that they were kept at close to full strength. Clearly mechanized corps represented a unique and special place in the Red Army order of battle.

Re-establishment of Mechanized Corps

Following the defeats of 1941, the armored forces had disbanded all the corps sized formations and had been reduced to brigade strength. However, larger formations were still required in order to implement the operational level tactics of ‘deep operation’ as envisaged by Triandafillov and Issserson. The first trial of a tank army sized formation took place in the Stalingrad Front on 22 July 1942 under STAVKA directive (Direktiva Stavki VGK № 994125) using two tank corps and three rifle divisions. It is clear from the outset that attempts were being made to provide tank armies with an infantry component.[3]

The first mechanized brigades were formed in April 1942 as motor rifle brigades (Motostrelkovaîa Brigady MSB), with many serving in tank corps. They were converted to mechanized brigades, by the addition of a tank regiment, during the formation of the mechanized corps. The first two mechanized corps were formed by NKO directive № 1104308ss on 8 September 1942 at the Moscow Armored Training Center (Moskovskiĭ uchebnyĭ avtobronetankovyĭ tŝentr ABT) at Kosterevo, followed a few days later by the third at Kalinin, fourth at Tatischenka and fifth at Gorky ABT. A second tranche of corps was formed in October with 1 & 2 Guards Mechanized Corps (Gvardeĭskiĭ Mekhanizirovannyĭ Korpus GMK) formed from 1 & 22 Guards Rifle Divisions at Tambov and then in November a sixth corps formed at Kosterevo.[4]

The units were created using the corps state № 010/290 and brigade state № 010/370-010/380, 010/292. A document defining their role, NKO Directive №325 ‘On the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations’ on 16 October 1942 stated that:

7. Mechanized corps are front or army commander assets and are used in the primary direction as the element developing the success of our forces and pursuing the enemy . . .

9. A mechanized corps may be used to develop a breakthrough only after the main battle line has been overcome with combined-arms formations and the advance of the infantry into the enemy artillery positions . . . . . . . . .

16. The basis for combat operations of the mechanized corps must be swift maneuver onto the flank and rear of enemy formations, swift deployment for battle, decisive and bold attack. [5]

While these objectives were clear enough, nonetheless there was some ambivalence regarding how to the achieve them in practice. The original six mechanized corps were formed with three different tank establishments, namely 1 & 2 MK had three tank regiments (state № 010/292) and one tank brigade (state № 010/240-010/248), a total of 175 tanks. 3 & 5 MK had three tank regiments (state № 010/292) and two tank brigade (state № 010/240-010/248) a total of 224 tanks, while 4 & 6 MK had five tank regiments (state № 010/292) with a total of 204 tanks (See Table 4 for details). These organizational differences reflected whether the tanks were expected to operate as a separate attack force in tank brigades, or were tasked with helping the infantry in tank regiments. This is illustrated by the order below in which the tank brigade was equipped with medium tanks in preference to the mechanized brigades:

5 Guards Zimovnikov Mechanized Corps – May 1943:

In connection with the organization of two battalions of medium tanks T-34 (brigade total 65 T-34 tanks) in 24 Tank Brigade and the transfer of all T-70 tanks to the tank regiments of mechanized brigades, it follows: in all types of combat the 24 Tank Brigade should be held in the second echelon of the corps’ order of battle, (Corps Commander’s reserve) and use it to attack the enemy in an independent direction or alongside one of the mechanized brigades. In other types of combat, the 24 Tank Brigade is subordinated to 32 Tank Brigade of 29 Tank Corps. Tank regiments of mechanized brigades are prepared for action in brigades, i.e. to directly accompany their motorized infantry on the battlefield.[6]

The later mechanized corps were mainly built around a structure of three regiments and one brigade, and attempts were made to standardize on this pattern. However, 1 MK retained two brigades until the end of the war, 4 MK retained two regiments and 8 MK and 6 GMK were formed with tank regiments instead of brigades due to shortage of suitable units. Similar shortages saw corps formed with Lend Lease tanks, such as the 5 MK receiving Mk2 (British Matilda) and Mk3 (British Valentine), while 7 MK self-propelled (SP) gun regiment received SU-76i vehicles converted from captured enemy tanks.

This was not the end of the organizational experimentation, since the two GMK formed in October used an establishment based on a guards rifle division (state № 04/550), creating a larger guards mechanized corps (state № 010/550) with three guards mechanized brigades (state № 010/551) and five guards tank regiments (state №010/552).[7] This experiment only lasted a few months, as the units converted to the new №010/418 establishment in March 1943.

In reality, the establishment of mechanized corps was remarkably stable, as tanks corps had been established since March 1942 and mechanized corps were able to draw heavily on this earlier experience and so avoid many initial teething problems, adopting proven establishments albeit with a different role.

The opening operational debut was by 1, 2 and 3 MK during the Rzhevsko-Sychëvskaî Offensive Operation (Operation Mars) and the Velikolukskaîa Offensive Operation in November 1942, while 4, 5 MK and 1, 2 GMK were deployed in the Stalingrad Offensive Operation the following month. The result were somewhat mixed and showed a lack of understanding of the role of mechanized corps by army commanders:

Conclusions:

1. The 1, 2 & 3 Mechanized Corps while conducting operations on the Kalinin Front are currently being used in violation of the order of NKO Order № 325:

a) Are entered into battle as separate sub-units, with individual units withdrawn from the corps and attached to reinforce rifle formations;

b) Used independently, without support, to break through strongly fortified enemy defenses, so losing their striking force and the possibility of developing success in depth.

c) From the moment they enter the battle, they do not receive sufficient time to put themselves in order for further successful actions.

2. By 15 January 1943, the 1,2 & 3 Mechanized Corps as a result of long and continuous battles have lost their striking force and have a large shortage of personnel, equipment and weapons. In order to maintain valuable combat personnel, the further presence of the corps at the front is not advisable.

3. It is necessary to withdraw the 1, 2 & 3 Mechanized Corps from the establishment of troops on the Kalinin Front to the Reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) and to recruit personnel.

Chief of Staff of the Armored and Mechanized Troops of Red Army (BT and MV KA) Colonel Zaev

Colonel Kulvinsky, Chief of the Operations Division, Headquarters of the BT and MV KA[8]

A number of lessons were learned from these initial operations and consequently the corps were reorganized in March 1943 in a new state for mechanized corps (state № 010/480) and brigades (state № 010/420-431), which retained almost exactly the same organization and structure, yet centralized the transport assets. The Motor Transport Platoon of each Motor Rifle Battalion (state № 010/370) lost the four sections for transporting personnel (32 personnel, one car and thirty one 1.5t trucks.) The 96 vehicles from the three rifle battalions were concentrated in a new Motor Transport Company (state №010/430) with 109 personnel. This left the new Motor Rifle Battalion (state №010/421) with one car, thirteen 1.5t trucks, eleven 2.5t lorries, one ambulance, one workshop Type A, two motorcycles and three kitchen trailers. These vehicles hauled four 45mm anti-tank guns, six 82mm mortars, nine machine-guns, radios, rations and cargo; no allowance was made to carry infantrymen.

Tank Armies

Following the initial experiment in September 1942, the State Defense Committee (GKO) ordered on 28 January 1943 the establishment of regular tank armies ‘On formation of 10 tank armies’ (Gosudarstvennyĭ Komitet Oborony Postanovlenie № GOKO-2791ss ‘O sformirovanii desîati tankovykh armiĭ’), which specified in some detail that each tank army should consist of two tank corps and a mechanized corps.

While this may have been the intention, the reality was somewhat different as can be seen from figure 1, as for the first half of 1943 only two out of the five tank armies deployed with a mechanized corps, for the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944 four out of the five did and for the remainder of the war five of the six had them. 2 Tank Army (2-îa Tankovaîa Armiîa 2 TA) operated for only nine months out of 29 with 1 MK. Similarly, 5 Guards Tank Army (5-îa Gvardeĭskaîa Tankovaîa Armiîa 5 GTA) operated for the last 12 months of the war with only the attached 47 MB, while at the other end of the scale 1 TA operated for the entire war with 3 MK (8 GMK).

Matching the deployment of mechanized corps to offensive operations shows that all seven of them were deployed in offensives during the winter of 1942-3, which was followed by a long wait in reserve over the following spring and summer. However, in August 1943, as part of the major Red Army counter offensive, no less than 10 out of 13 mechanized corps were deployed in Operation Rumyantsev (4), Kutuzov (1), Suvorov (1), the Donbass Strategic Operation (3) and the Chernihiv-Pripyat Operation (1). This major effort was not as successful as was expected, probably due to a lack of mobility. Thereafter, for 1943-44 five corps are seen in tank armies, another four with the southern fronts and four in strategic reserve.

Yet the deployment of mechanized corps to tanks armies did not mean that they were actually used in these operations. For example, in March 1944, all six tank armies were deployed in two simultaneous operations, the Uman-Botsani Offensive Operation (2, 6 and 5 GTA with 5 MK & 5 GMK) and the Proskurovo-Zhmerinsky Offensive Operation (1, 4 and 3 GTA with 8, 6 GMK & 9 MK) and 2 Ukrainian Front had two further corps (7 & 8 MK). However, the only corps that took an active part in these operations, were the 5 MK in 6 TA, 8 GMK in 1 TA and 6 GMK in 4 TA as these three tank armies could only field one tank corps each. The other three tank armies all had more than two tank corps and their mechanized corps stayed in reserve, as did the corps assigned to the fronts.

In the period between August 1943 and March 1944, the Red Army had been unable to initiate a ‘deep operation’, as the combined-arms armies had been unable to achieve a clean breakthrough for the tank armies or the tank armies had been intercepted by strong reserves. The tank armies had achieved a rate of advance little different from that of combined-arms armies during the pursuit of retreating German forces. The Uman-Botsani Operation is significant, as it was the first operation where the Soviet armored forces managed a successful ‘deep operation’. From this point onward, tank armies would undertake offensives with advances of over 400km where both rapidity of advance, in excess of 20-25km a day and the ability to sustain this over a period of 15 days was important. For instance in the L’vov-Peremyshl’ Operation STAVKA ordered that:

1. Use the tank armies and cavalry-mechanized groups to exploit success after penetration rather than for the penetration themselves. In the event of a successful penetration, commit the tank armies the day after the commencement of the operation and the cavalry-mechanized groups two days after the commencement of the operation, following the tank armies.[9]

During this operation, the 9 MK of 3 GTA advanced in the following manner:

‘the tank brigades motorized riflemen rode on the tanks. The mechanized corps’ motorized infantry completed the march on foot. The motorized infantry completed the 120km long march in 35 hours. They arrived at their designated regions seven to ten hours later than the tanks. The high tempo of the motorized infantryman’s movement was thanks to the fact that they had been well trained for the forced march during the preparatory period.’[10]

So by using the tank brigade and dividing the mechanized brigades into mobile ‘forward detachments’ and slow ‘infantry detachments’, the mechanized corps gained sufficient mobility to be an effective part of the tank armies.

The deployment pattern of mechanized corps is shown in figure 2 and continued for most of the summer of 1944 with four mechanized corps deployed with tank armies, an additional two deployed on southern fronts, one each on northern and central fronts and five in RVGK strategic reserve. However, after October 1944, with an increasing number of operations, more mechanized corps were released from the reserves and deployed to the fronts with only one mechanized corps left in the RVGK.

This is illustrated by Table 1, which shows that mechanized corps spent 32% of their wartime days on operations, 32% in RGVK and 35% in front/army reserve.[11] This pattern changed widely throughout the war years, with an operational low point of 1944 when the corps spent 68% of their time in reserve.

From the point of view of individual mechanized corps, there was a wide variation in their deployment pattern. For instance, 1 GMK spent just 25% of its time on operations, spending the whole of 1944 in reserve and a total of 227 days on operations, with 135 days in 1943 and 78 days in 1945. By contrast, its sister unit 2 GMK spent 43% or 374 days on operations, including 156 days in 1944. Other hard working units included the 4, 7 and 9 MK.

Establishment of mechanized corps and brigades

The current canonical works are in Russian O.A. Losik Stroitelʹstvo i boevoe primenenie sovetskikh tankovykh voĭsk v gody Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny (1979)[12] and in English S.J. Zaloga and L.S. Ness Companion to the Red Army 1939-45 (2009).[13] Yet neither source provides more than a basic outline, with neither providing state (shtat) numbers for any unit other than mechanized brigades.[14] The table of changes to wartime establishment on page 70 of Losik disagrees with a similar table on page 87 of Zaloga, except for the year 1943. The only detailed tables are for mechanized brigades in Zaloga and Ness Table 2.17 ‘Mechanized brigade summary (state № 010/370-380) from September 1942ʹ and Table 2.18 ‘Mechanized brigade summary (state №10/420-432) from February 1943 amended September 1943ʹ. While Table 2.17 is complete and accurate, Table 2.18 is missing the Motor Transport Company (state № 010/430) with 109 men and 95 vehicles, which renders brigade totals useless. Also, the brigade includes an Anti-Aircraft Machine Gun Company (state № 010/451) so it is misnamed and should read (state №010/420-451). In this regard, in the printed literature, the organization of these units remains incomplete and obscure.

Establishment of mechanized brigades

A new examination of these units’ establishments is based on four sources, one the organizational diagrams of the General Staff[15], two a document entitled ‘Doklad o razvitii bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voĭsk Krasnoĭ Armii v khode Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Vĭnyvoĭny’[16], three a complete copy of state № 370-380[17] and four a large number of documents from the Pamyat Naroda website. To date, no copy of state №420-451 Mechanized Brigade has been found. However, it is known that the changes between this and state №370-380 Mechanized Brigade were limited to a reorganization in transport and minor personnel changes. Despite this help, the task of recreating the state and matching it to existing Pamyat Naroda documents, was made more difficult by a number of factors. Firstly, mechanized brigades included a tank regiment with a number of different states: № 010/292 or № 010/414 or № 010/463 or № 010/464 or № 010/465 or № 010/507. It was not always clear which one was being used at any particular time. In addition, state № 010/414 had three different versions, with varying number of personnel, light tanks and anti-tank rifles. Secondly, the total number of personnel in a Motor Rifle Battalion went through at least three changes. The original Motor Rifle Battalion № 010/371 had 641 personnel. However, in February 1943, the new version № 010/471 had 662 and by August 1943, this had changed to 649 personnel. Likewise, the Administration Company organization stayed the same during the changeover from № 010/378 to № 010/427, with 105 personnel and yet in March 1943 it was reduced to 73 personnel. Thirdly, the AA artillery division state № 010/374 or AA machine-gun company state № 010/451 were sometimes included in the establishment totals and sometimes not.

A mechanized brigade had exactly the same establishment as the motor rifle brigade found in tank corps, yet while they share state numbers, the only difference between them was the addition of a tank regiment, which at this period was typically state № 010/292.[18]

As can be seen from Table 2, in state № 010/379 each motor rifle battalion had its own transport with one motorcycle and one GAZ 1.5t truck for radios for the command, four ZIS 2.5t lorries pulling anti-tank guns in the anti-tank gun battery, five GAZ trucks for cargo and munitions in the mortar battery, with a GAZ ambulance in the first aid point. The supply company possessed one car and 31 GAZ trucks to carry personnel with two ZIS lorries for fuel, two for munitions and two for chemical defense, while the repair platoon had a workshop type A and GAZ truck for spares and another for personnel and its economic supply platoon had a GAZ truck for rations, another two for personnel and sanitary stores and three ZIS lorries pulling large four-wheeled infantry/artillery type kitchen trailers. Each of the three rifle companies had 124 men and two heavy machine-guns, with another 30 in the SMG platoon and 40 more with 12 anti-tank rifles in their platoon. Given that each GAZ truck carried 16 men[19], this was just enough to carry all the personnel and heavy weapons of the battalion.

Table 2 Shtat 010/370-380 Motor Rifle Brigade March 1942

Similarly in the brigade, every unit had just enough transport to move the personnel, equipment and weapons, yet the 29 GAZ trucks in the technical company were insufficient to move anything other than the most basic level of supplies. In short, this brigade was not fully motorized, as it could either move its personnel or it could move its supplies, but not both together.

While this was sufficient in March 1942 for conducting the limited operations of the period, by 28 January 1943 when the order went out to create tank armies designed to conduct deep operations, reform was clearly needed. It is of interest that the 28 January 1943 order specified the new state 010/418 for both tank and mechanized corps and the new state 010/420 for their brigades, although these states were not officially authorized until March 1943. The numbers of personnel used in the tank army order show that draft versions of the states were being used and clearly seeking a more efficient use of the available transport.

The № 010/420-451 mechanized brigade is shown in table 3[20] and illustrates that the only substantial change was to the arrangement of transport.

Table 3 Shtat 010/420-451 Motor Rifle Brigade April 1943

Establishment of mechanized corps

Determining the establishment of any particular mechanized corps during the war is made more complex, because firstly the mechanized brigades varied in their establishment, secondly the tank brigades varied in establishment, and finally there was a great variety in the number and type of supporting units assigned to any particular mechanized corps, on any given date. A basic chronology would show the original six corps being raised using mechanized brigade №010/370-80, tank regiment state №010/292 and either tank brigade state №010/240 or №010/270, always remembering that there were three different arrangements of tank brigades/regiments. The mechanized brigade changed state in March 1943 to №010/420-451 and then around March 1944, the tank regiments changed to state №010/465 and the tank brigades were standardized with state №010/500. At that point a degree of standardization was achieved, as 4 (3 GMK) and 6 (5 GMK) MK swapped their two tank regiments for a tank brigade and only 1 MK retained its original two tank brigade establishment.

At the other end of the scale, the five mechanized corps[21] which were formed later, had a ‘Frankenstein’ quality about them, being formed from whatever was at hand. So 8 MK which was assembled in August 1943, contained three mechanized brigades state № 010/420-451, two of which used tank regiment state № 010/414 and one used № 010/292 and instead of a tank brigade, it used a single tank regiment state № 010/345 until June 1944 when it finally received a tank brigade state № 010/500.

The ambitious plan to form 10 tank armies, effectively one for each front, was canceled on 7 May 1943 following Resolution No. GOKO-3309ss ‘Ending the formation of new tank units and the replenishment of operational units’. Clearly raising this large number of tank and mechanized units was beyond the ability of the Soviet state to both build, and more importantly to sustain, given the comparative rates of loss and production.

The authorized sub-units changed on regular basis as well, although the tendency was for them to steadily increase in number as mechanized corps developed more complex establishments. However, as Zaloga points out, there were never enough of any one type of sub-unit to go round, so some units never received them. The result of these factors was that it was rare for any two mechanized corps to have the same establishment at any given point.

Nonetheless, the first six mechanized corps were formed according to the scheme given in Table 4[22]

This establishment was amended on 17 September by the addition of a motorcycle battalion state № 010/353 (237 personnel) and on 26 November the addition of medical-sanitary battalion № 04/566 (103 personnel), field bakery № 04/567 (94 personnel) and a field office of the State Bank (Gosbank) №04/16 (3 personnel). Other minor changes saw the elimination of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun regiments, number changes for the fuel company and repair battalion and the tank regiments transfer to state № 010/414. On 10 January 1943, NKO order № 20 added a RGK mortar regiment state № 08/106 and a RGK SP gun artillery regiment state № 08/158, so that by the end of January 1943 the corps looked as in table 5.[23]

The next change was the major reorganization of transport within the corps to increase its mobility prior to working with tank armies, which was promulgated in NKO directive №1125236 on 21 March 1943. This changed the corps to state № 010/418 together with the new brigade structure as described above and further orders changed the command company into a signals company state № 010/561, the field post office to state № 014/97-A, added an AA regiment state № 010/452 and added an AA machine-gun company state № 010/451 to each tank and mechanized brigade.

By the time the mechanized corps were next committed in operations in July 1943, they had been strengthened by a destroyer anti-tank regiment state № 08/100 with twenty 45mm guns, an anti-tank battalion state № 010/466 with twelve 85mm guns, a chemical defense company state № 010/563 and reorganized the SP artillery regiment into a heavy SP artillery regiment state № 010/454 with twelve SU-152 and a KV tank.

With 6 GMK, the last of thirteen mechanized corps, formed by June 1943, they were steadily strengthened with additional supporting units in August; added to this was the replacement of the towed anti-tank artillery regiment and battalion with a SP artillery regiment №010/435 state №010/435 (21 SU-76) and 010/453 (SU-85), a clothing workshop state № 04/215, and making the guards mortar battalion (rockets) a permanent addition. In September, the heavy mortar regiment transferred to state №08/540 with thirty six 120mm mortars, while October saw another reorganization of SP artillery regiments moving №010/454 to №010/482 (12 SU-152 one KV) №010/453 to 010/483 (16 SU-85) and №010/455 to №010/484 (21 SU-76). For those corps outside tank armies, October saw their armored car battalions exchanged for a motorcycle battalion №010/487 and a Corps Exchange Point (KOP) state №010/486 was introduced. These changes would be extended to the other corps in tank armies the following month and the corps’ tank brigade would change from state №010/270-277 to №010/500-506 with 65 T-34, at which point a typical corps would look like the one in Table 6.[24]

While all these administrative changes would suggest a state of constant change, the reality for the units was quite different, as can be seen from the deployment of SP artillery regiments. The mixed SP regiment ordered to join corps in January 1943 finally arrived in July and only in 6 MK. By August eight corps had received regiments, mainly armed with SU-152, yet some such as 1 MK would not receive their first unit until June 1944 or in the case of 2 MK November, when it received three regiments armed with SU-76M, SU-85 and ISU-122. It took until the winter of 1944 before most corps had two regiments; only two received the full establishment of three and 5 MK only ever received one. Nor were these units necessarily assigned on a permanent basis. The 1823 SP Artillery Regiment stayed with 4 MK (3 GMK) for the entire war from June 1943. However, 5 MK only had regiments in July-October 1943, January-February 1944, April-May, September-October and March-May 1945 with different units at each point.

The organizational changes reduced in tempo for the remainder of the war. In February 1944, the SP artillery units increased in size to a uniform 21 guns each, with SU-152 regiments moving from № 010/482 to № 010/461, SU-85 regiments from № 010/483 to № 010/462 and SU-76 regiments from № 010/484 to № 010/463. An artillery workshop № 010/315 was added in June and the Guards Mortar Division (rockets) changed from № 08/83 to № 010/514, yet still retained 8 launchers. The main changes came in September when those corps attached to tank armies, finally received their own Corps Supply Point (KOP) № 010/486 and in November when the Repair and Maintenance Battalion № 010/415 was enlarged into two Field Repair Bases (Polevaîa Remontnaîa Baza PRB), one for tanks № 016/405 and one for wheeled vehicles № 032/87. These changes resulted in the formation shown in Table 7 by 1 January 1945.[25] The records of 2 GTA confirm the state numbers for late war mechanized corps.[26]

The establishment reality – elite units of a peasant army

It was common practice in the Red Army for units to be less than their establishment authorized total and in the case of rifle divisions this difference could be considerable. Remarkably, mechanized brigades were maintained close to their establishment strength in personnel and weapons, as were their parent mechanized corps. In order to illustrate this, what is needed is an example where the units start from a period of rest and then conduct a series of operations.

Fortunately, in August 1944 following the capture of territory east of the Vistula, the 1 & 2 GTA were withdrawn for refitting in Poland and were next deployed on 16 January 1945 in the Warsaw-Lodz-Posen Operation, followed by the East Pomeranian Operation which lasted until April. 2 GTA contained 1 MK, (19, 35, 37 MB,) 9 GTK, (33 GMSB) and 12 GTK (34 GMSB), a total of five mechanized units. There was a report on 20 December 1944 which showed the entire breakdown of 2 GTA for personnel, weapons and equipment.[27]

In this 1 MK had a state total of 16,368 personnel and was 399 personnel short of establishment, while the mechanized brigades had stated totals of 3,592 personnel and were respectively 19 MB, 75 under strength; 35 MB, 131 under strength; and 37 MB, 184. Likewise, the motor rifle brigades had a state of 3,221 personnel, yet 33 GMSB (9 GTK) was 54 personnel short and 34 GMSB (12 GTK) was 191 personnel short. A similar picture emerges with regard to weapons which were almost at full strength.

It is a different picture with regards to transport, as 2 GTA was like most Soviet armored units, operating with less than three quarters of their assigned transport, as illustrated in Table 8.

Table 8 Transport of 2 Guards Tank Army 20 December 1944

Nor did the situation improve at corps level, as 1 MK should have fielded 60 cars, 1,587 lorries, 193 specials, 7 tractors and 214 motorcycles, yet it only had 43 cars, 1,015 lorries, 181 specials, 2 tractors and 176 motorcycles, leaving it 64% of its official strength in lorries.

If anything, the situation at mechanized brigade level was worse, as instead of the 8 cars, 317 lorries, 32 specials and 20 motorcycles authorized in the state documents, 19 MB had 7 cars, 188 lorries, 29 specials, 7 motorcycles, while 35 MB had 5 cars, 195 lorries, 21 specials, 20 motorcycles and 37 MB had 6 cars, 188 lorries, 25 specials and 2 motorcycles or 59% of authorized lorry strength.

In the motor rifle brigades there should have been 6 cars, 262 lorries 23 specials, 15 motorcycles, while 33 GMSB actually possessed 29 horses, 9 cars, 167 lorries, 13 specials, no tractors and 5 motorcycles and 34 GMSB fielded 69 horses, 6 cars, 166 lorries, 15 specials with no tractors or motorcycles, or 63% of authorized lorry establishment.

Of course, this situation may have been a result of 2 GTA still being behind the lines in its assembly areas in December, as the start of the offensive was still some 25 days away. However, a report dated 15 January 1945 shows the army fully staffed with tanks[28] and another dated 6 January 1945 shows an improvement in vehicle numbers with 2 GTA now at 75.9%, 1 MK at 73.2%, 9 GTK at 78.0% and 12 GTK at 68.0%[29] Care must be taken with evaluating these figures since the state numbers have increased, which would indicate that new units have joined in addition to reinforcement of existing ones.

An examination of documents relating to 19 MB shows the plan for the approach march of the brigade from the assembly area into the concentration area and then crossing the Vistula river into the bridgehead for the start of the offensive.[30] The second page of this document dated 29 December 1944 shows 148 1.5t and 87 2.5t lorries for a total of 235 lorries. Another report on 10 January reveals that 19MB fielded 3,526 personnel, 36 M4-A2 (Sherman), nine M3-A1 (White scout car), six Mk-1 (Universal carrier), six SU-M-17 (M17 half-track with AA guns), eight BA-64 (armored cars) and transport of 130 1.5t lorries, 90 2.5t lorries, 19 1.5t specials, eight 2.5t specials, 7 cars and 9 motorcycles[31] This represented a total of 254 motor vehicles or 71% of the authorized state number. The number of lorries had improved from the 20 December figure of 217 to a 29 December figure of 235 to a 10 January figure of 247. This shows that 30 lorries were added to the brigade in the 25 days leading up to the offensive. The overall numbers for 2 GTA would indicate that similar small increases occurred in the other brigades too.

An assessment of the types of vehicle can be assembled from a 2 GTA report of 21 December 1944[32] which shows 1 MK with 46 cars (eight M-1 and 38 Willies jeeps,) 515 1.5t lorries (30 GAZ-AA, 60 Ford, 425 Chevrolet,) 539 2.5t lorries (33 ZIS-5, 482 Studebaker, 24 others,) with 12 Dodge 3/4 weapon carriers, 23 buses, 36 fuel bowsers, 57 workshops, 11 battery chargers and 25 others such as ambulances, for a total of 1,264. The predominance of Lend Lease vehicles demonstrates the elite status of these units which entitled them to the best equipment, in contrast to Combined-arms Armies which made do with a largely Soviet or trophy fleet.[33]

Unfortunately, this level of data is not available for the other brigades of 2 GTA. However, the 27 GMSB of 11 GTK of 1 GTA does provide a supporting picture for motor rifle brigades. A loading document from 6 December 1944 shows that the brigade fielded five cars, 12 Studebaker, 26 ZIS-5, 62 GAZ-AA, four Ford, 10 Chevrolet, seven Mack, 25 Dodge ¾ plus 10 carriers, seven BA-64, eight motorcycles and nine specials, for a total 185 motor vehicles (including 146 lorries) with a capacity of 258 tonnes.[34]

The calculation shows 87 personnel carried on the combat vehicles (carriers, armored cars and motorcycles, while the balance required 155 ZIS-5 lorries and cargo requirements were 36t small arms munitions, 70t artillery munitions, 18t fuel, 22t rations and 41t of other stores, which required 122 GAZ-AA lorries, plus a further four lorries to carry 82mm mortars and six to carry machine guns and AT rifles. The author calculates these to be 287 vehicles and the overall shortage to be 124 ZIS-5. This view is supported by a march scheme of the same date which shows each of the motor rifle battalions with only 15 vehicles (85 personnel), while the establishment shows one truck for radios, one for telephones, three for transport of machine-guns, four lorries to haul AT guns, five for transport of mortars, one workshop and four lorries for the supply section, plus one supply truck and one kitchen lorry for each company and an ambulance, an establishment total of 26 vehicles, none of whom carried any riflemen.[35]

The basis for these types of calculation are supported by a calculation table for the 26 MSB of 19 TK in July 1944, which shows the loading of personnel on lorries as US-6: 30 men, ZIS-5: 30 men, Ford: 20 men and GAZ-AA: 16 men.[36] Which begs the questions: with so little personnel transport available, how did the mechanized and motor rifle brigades move as part of a tank army?

Overcoming the shortages in transport

By consulting maps, it is possible to establish the speed of advance of the brigades and their corps as a whole and 2 GTA has a complete set for the Warsaw-Lodz-Pozen Operation.[37] These reporting maps show the position of each of the nine brigades for the two tank and one mechanized corps comprising 2 GTA, several times a day and, in addition, some of the larger supporting units such as the motorcycle regiments. Taking 19 MB as an example, on the opening morning of the offensive on 16 January 1945, it was positioned behind the pontoon bridges over the river Pilicha in the concentration area of the bridgehead. Later in the morning, it crossed the bridges into the breakthrough zone and then continued north to the settlement of Pryiech, where it turned onto the road running north-west, reaching the town of Mshchonuv by 19:00. From here it set out west towards the town of Skernevitŝv, which was held by enemy units and it was positioned outside the town ready to attack by 8:00 a.m. on 17 January. 19 MB had covered a distance of around 60 km in a little under 24 hours when the best performance of a marching unit might be half that distance. The 35 MB and 37 MB and 219 Tank Brigade were close behind and the two tank corps were even further in advance, both with their motor rifle brigades. It is clear from this and other later examples, that the mechanized/motor rifle brigades of 2 GTA were moving very quickly indeed.

A detailed examination of the march order of 29 December 1944 shows how it was done.[38] This document was created to plan the move of 19 MB from its assembly area 65 km to the east of the Vistula into an assembly area beside the river and then cross the river into the concentration area in the bridgehead, for the start of the offensive on 15 January 1945. It included a loading calculation table on page two showing the available transport and how the personnel were distributed. According to this, the brigade had 3,498 personnel, 234 motor vehicles and 72 combat vehicles (including 9 motorcycles.)

The purpose of the table was to calculate the shortage in the number of vehicles needed to carry all of the brigade’s weapons, personnel and stores. The author of the report put this requirement at 265 lorries, with an actual shortage of 50 2.5t vehicles. In reality, the shortage was only 30, because the brigade owned 235 lorries. The largest error is that the author has double counted the personnel of 2 Motor Rifle Battalion because out of 601 men, he allocated 300 to act as tank riders (Desant) for 9 Tank Regiment, there were 226 crewmen for guns/mortars carried on their gun tractors, and 61 men traveled on stores lorries. However, the author has allocated 314 men to be carried on transport lorries when in fact, only 14 need travel this way (he overstated the requirement by 10 lorries).

The distribution reveals that in reality, over two thirds of the brigade personnel were carried as crew on combat or weapons vehicles and the brigade only needed to find space for around 1,200 marching riflemen or around 40 2.5t lorries, even when the brigade had only 70% of its total establishment of vehicles. This was in addition to the 100 vehicles hauling cargo (in this case with 2.6 refuellings, 1.5 load of munitions and 10 days rations). This combined demand of 140 vehicles exceeded the capacity of the brigade’s own motor transport company of four platoons, which had an establishment of 93 GAZ-AA trucks, a fuel bowser and a workshop.

The fact that the mechanized brigade, even when under-staffed in vehicles, should have a large portion of its personnel being fully motorized, should not obscure the fact that every single vehicle was loaded to capacity with personnel. For instance, the Medical-Sanitary Platoon (№ 010/431) had an establishment of nine officers, five NCO and 19 Red Army men, with three ambulances and two lorries carrying five tonnes of equipment and stores and was only 1 man short in 19MB. This meant that each GAZ-AA ambulance carried eight men: a driver and assistant and six passengers. In reality, this in fact meant that there was no room for any casualties.

In this case, the solution to the problem can be found on page three of the march order, which is a diagram of the column of march and shows the total number of vehicles as 432.[39] The extra vehicles come from additional units from 1 MK, namely 1382 AA Artillery Regiment, 63 Separate Sapper Battalion and 75 SP Artillery Regiment. No doubt, these provided the extra transport capacity to cover any shortages in the 19 MB fleet.

Other units adopted different solutions. 27 GMSB of 11 GTK (1 GTA) on 5 December was moving to its assembly area partly by road and partly by rail. It was fully staffed with personnel and weapons, yet short of transport,[40] with only 185 vehicles with a load capacity of 258 tonnes (287 vehicles were needed). This meant that 67 wagons (2 trains) were required to move 1,307 men, 20 horses and 108 tonnes of cargo[41], while the march diagram clearly shows each motor rifle battalion with only 15 vehicles.[42]

By 7 February 1945, towards the end of Vistula-Lodz-Posen Operation, the brigade had fallen to 2,714 personnel and 146 vehicles. However, it had acquired 281 horses with wagons.[43] During the following East Pomeranian Operation on 23 March 1945, the brigade had 192 vehicles (331t), which could carry 2,010 personnel and 136 tonnes of cargo, leaving 1,204 personnel and 91 tonnes of cargo to march or be carried on horse-drawn wagons. To lift each motor rifle battalion required 62 horses and 27 wagons to haul the mortars, machine guns, anti-tank rifles, kitchen trailers, stores and headquarters equipment such as radios and two battalions had to march in this way.[44] Once the brigade moved to take part in the Berlin Operation, it lost all but 26 of its horses, but its transport fleet was reinforced to 210 vehicles for its 2,728 personnel.[45]

Up to this point, the focus has been on mechanized brigades operating as part of a tank army. However, there were a number of mechanized corps which provided the mobile force especially for the northern fronts. One of these was 47 Separate Mechanized Brigade, which acted as part of the Mobile Mechanized Group of the Kalinin Front up to October 1944 when it joined 5 GTA as an additional brigade for the East Prussia Operation. In September 1944, the brigade’s 18 Tank Regiment was equipped with 23 Sherman M4-A2 tanks (state № 010/465 - 12 short,) 3,486 personnel and 341 motor vehicles so again, fully up to strength in personnel and weapons and only 17 vehicles short of establishment (95%). Nor was this unusual, as back in February the brigade had possessed 313 motor vehicles, of which 174 were Ford-6 types.[46] This shows that mechanized corps operating independently were as well equipped as those operating as part of tank armies.

Conclusion

Clearly, mechanized corps and brigades represented an unusual and special type of unit in the Red Army, as considerable resources were lavished on them and they were held in reserve for use in specific operations of high importance. Even given their initial failures and misuses, STAVKA persevered and finally produced powerful, mobile forces that played a major role in the last eighteen months of the war.

In judging their mobility, the closest comparison is a 1944 British Armored Division, which fielded 14,964 personnel, 290 tanks and 3,124 vehicles of which 2,098 were lorries, compared to a Mechanized Corps of 1944 (№ 010/418) which possessed 16,369 personnel, 243 tanks/SP guns and 1,723 vehicles, of which just 1,468 were lorries. The British division possessed an infantry brigade of four battalions which was fully motorized. By comparison, the Soviet mechanized corps had three mechanized brigades each of three motor rifle battalions. Each battalion only possessed 27 support vehicles, leaving the riflemen to march on foot. The 92 trucks in each brigade’s Motor Transport Company could lift two out of the three battalions, leaving a rifle battalion, SMG company and ATR company on foot. In reality, most of this transport was committed to hauling the more than 300 tonnes of supplies.

Yet mechanized corps were supposed to be an integral part of tank armies, even while the bulk of their infantry marched on foot and this dichotomy widened throughout the summer of 1944, as tank armies steadily increased the tempo of their advance. Mechanized corps responded to this challenge with a variety of solutions, from forced marches of 120 km duration, to squeezing the maximum number of men onto every vehicle, and finally onto the vehicles belonging to attached units such as sappers, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions. Even so, a part of the corps or brigade might still be left on foot and even using captured horses. Nonetheless, by using a combination of often ad hoc solutions, the command of mechanized corps gained sufficient mobility to maintain the tempo of the tank army and provide it with a substantial infantry component when it reached the final objective of its ‘deep operation’.

While it is true that mechanized corps were allocated the most modern vehicles, provided by the United States through Lend Lease, the scale of this allocation was quite modest and insufficient to lift the entire corps. The capability came from Soviet ingenuity in utilizing these modest means to their maximum extent, in squeezing every last ounce of mobility from a limited number of vehicles, not from an overwhelming supply of materiel.

Notes

2 10 Mechanized Corps and 72 Mechanized Brigade were a short lived formations formed for the attack on Japan.

3 The remainder, 48, 50 Mechanised Brigades and 32 Guards Mechanized Brigade were all short lived formations.

4 V. A Zolotarev et al., Russkij Archiv. Velikaja Otečestvennaja: T. 16, 5-2 Stavka Verchovnogo Glavnokomandovanija : dokumenty i materialy, 1942 [Russian Archive. Great Patriotic War: T. 16, 5-2 STAVKA of the Supreme High Command: documents and materials, 1942], vol. 16 5-2, 1999, p.320 №439.

5 V.A. Zolotarev, ed., Russkij archiv. Velikaja Otečestvennaja: T. 13 2-2 Prikazy narodnogo komissara oborony SSSR. 22 iîunîa 1941 g. — 1942 g. [Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War: V. 13 2-2 Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR. 22 iîunîa 1941 - 1942], Russkij archiv: Velikaja Otečestvennaja (Moskva: ТЕРРА, 1997), p.346 №278 NKO № 00220 22 Oktîabrîa 1942 g.: Prikaz o sformirovanii meхanizirovannyх korpusov [22 October 1942: Order for the formation of mechanized corps.].

6 Zolotarev, p.334 №271 Prikaz o bokkevom priepepii tapkovykh i mekhapizirovappykh chasteĭ i soedtperĭ [On the combat use of tank and mechanized units and formations].

7 Nachalʹnik shtaba 5-ĭ gvardeĭskoĭ tankovoĭ armii [Chief of staff 5 GTA], ‘Kratkaîa Instruktiîŝa Po Nekotorym Voprosam Boevogo Ispolʹzovaniîa Chasteĭ i Soedineniĭ 5-ĭ Gvardeĭskoĭ Tankovoĭ Armii v Svîazi s Chastichnym Pereraspredeleniem Tankov i Artillerii v Chastîakh Armii (21 Maîa 1943 g.) [Brief Instruction on Some Issues in Combat of Units and Formations of 5th Guards Tank Army in Connection with the Partial Redistribution of Tanks and Artillery in Units of the Army (May 21, 1943)]’, in Sbornik Boevykh Dokumentov Velikoi Otechestestvennoi Voĭny [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], vol. 15, 43 vols, 1956, http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/SbornikBoevyhDokumentov/Issue15/Issue15_04.html.

8 ‘Donesenie o chislennom i boevom sostave chasteĭ 1 Gv. Mk [Report on the numerical and combat composition of the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps]’, 27 December 1942, Fond 312, Opisʹ 4245, Delo 17, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134906821.

9 A. O. Belykh, A. M. Radionov, and G. ÎU. Хaritonov, Glavnoe avtobronetankovoe upravlenie : lîudi, sobytiîa, fakty v dokumentakh [The Main Auto-Armoured Directorate - People, events, facts in documents.], vol. kn. 4. 1944-1945 (Moskva: Ministerstvo oborony RF, 2004), p.51 № 36: Spravka-doklad nachalʹʹnika Shtaba BT i MV KA ob ispolʹʹzovanii i deĭstviîaх 1,2 i 3-go Meхanizirovannyх Korpusov na Kalininskom Fronte [No. 36: Reference report by the Chief of Staff of the BT and MV KA on the use and actions of the 1, 2 and 3 Mechanized Corps on the Kalinin Front.].

10 David M Glantz, Harold S Orenstein, and Generalʹnyĭ shtab, The Battle for L’vov, July 1944: the Soviet General Staff study (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), p.22.

11 Glantz, Orenstein, and Generalʹnyĭ shtab, p.124.

12 Shtab bronetankovyх i meхanizirovannyх voisk sovetskoĭ armіi [Headquarters of the Armored and Mechanized Military Schools of the Soviet Army], ‘Gvardeĭskie Meхanizirovannye Korpusa Boevoĭ Sostav i Boevaîa Deîatelʹnostʹ Za 1941-1945 g.g. v Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭne. s 1 Gv. Mk Po 9 Gv. Mk Vkdîuchitelʹno. [Guards Mechanized Corps: Combat Composition and Combat Activity for 1941-1945 in the Great Patriotic War. Part U1 - from 1 to 9 Guard Mech Corps Inclusively.’, 1951, TsAMO; Shtab bronetankovyх i meхanizirovannyх voisk sovetskoĭ armіi [Headquarters of the Armored and Mechanized Military Schools of the Soviet Army], ‘Istoricheskie Spravki Na Mekhanizirovannye Korpusa 1-10 Boevoĭ Sostav i Boevaîa Deîatelʹnostʹ Za 1941-1945 g.g. v Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭne. [Historical Information on Mechanized Corps 1-10: Combat Composition and Combat Activity for 1941-1945 in the Great Patriotic War.]’, 1951, TsAMO.

13 O.A. Losika [O.A. Losik], Stroitelʹstvo i boevoe primenenie sovetskikh tankovykh voĭsk v gody Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭny [Construction and combat use of Soviet tank forces during the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979), pp.44-79.

14 Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness, Companion to the Red Army 1939-1945 (Stroud: The History Press, 2009), pp.82-89.

15 Zaloga and Ness was originally published as Red Army Handbook 1939-45 and was last published in 2003. Earlier works such as Charles C. Sharp “Red Storm”. Soviet Mechanized Corps and Guards Armoured Units 1942 to1945. Soviet Orders of Battle of World War II Volume III (George Nafziger, 1995) rely heavily on German intelligence sources.

16 ‘Al’ bom No.54 Skhem Organizatiiŝ Chasteĭ i Soedinenii Krasnoĭ Armii - Voennogo Vremeni 1944 [Album No. 54 of Organisation of Units and Commands of the Red Army - Military Period 1944]’ (1 Otdel Orgupravleniîa GOU Genshtaba V.S., 20 March 1944), № 41-46, 70, Opisi.179416ss dela. 25 korobki. 9336, Arkhiv MO SSSR; ‘Alʹbom No.50 Skhem Organizatiŝi Chasteĭ i Soedinenii Krasnoĭ Armii - Voennogo Vremeni 1944 [Album No. 50 of Organisation of Units and Commands of the Red Army - Military Period 1944]’ (1 Otdel Orgupravleniîa GOU Genshtaba V.S., 20 March 1944), № 156, 178, 230, 232, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 247-253, Opisi.179416ss dela. 25 korobki. 9336, Arkhiv MO SSSR.

17 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], ‘Doklad o razvitii bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voĭsk Krasnoĭ Armii v khode Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Vĭny [Report on the development of armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War]’ (1945), pp.47-52, Fond: 38, Opisʹ:11373, Delo: 158, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 4355, TsAMO.

18 Copy provided by Gary Kennedy

19 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], ‘Doklad o razvitii bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voĭsk Krasnoĭ Armii v khode Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Vĭny [Report on the development of armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War]’, 47–50.

20 ‘Predvaritelʹnoe Rasporîazhenie Shtaba 26 Msbr [Preliminary Order of the Headquarters of the 26 Motor Rifle Brigade]’, 3 August 1944, p.4, Fond: 3376, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0011, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 59, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451530186. Provided by Dmitriy Shaferov.. This shows that a GAZ-AA carried 16 men, a Ford-6 20 men, ZIS-5 30 men and US-6 30 men.

21 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], ‘Doklad o razvitii bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voĭsk Krasnoĭ Armii v khode Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Vĭny [Report on the development of armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War]’, 47–50.

22 The first batch of mechanized corps were 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 MK and 1, 2 GMK were formed between September and December 1942. The second batch of mechanized corps included 7, 8, 9 MK and 4, 6 GMK and although their formation was ordered in January 1943, their formation was delayed to as late as September 1943..

23 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army], p.307 This source states that 1, 2 MK were raised with three tank regiments and one brigade, 3, 5 MK with three regiments and two brigades and 4, 6 MK with five tank regiments. This is at variance with the established references which state that 1, 2, 3 MK were formed with 3 regiments and two brigades, 5 MK with three regiments and one brigade and 4, 6 MK with five regiments.

24 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], p.309.

25 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], p.314 Scheme 7.

26 1st Otdel Upravleniîa Formirovaniîa i Ukomplektovaniîa BT i MV KA and [1st Department of Formation and Manning of BT and MV KA (Armored and Mechanized Forces Red Army)], ‘Doklad o razvitii bronetankovykh i mekhanizirovannykh voĭsk Krasnoĭ Armii v khode Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Vĭny [Report on the development of armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War]’.

27 ‘Doklad o materialʹno-tekhnicheskoĭ obespechennosti, ukomplektovannosti i boevom sostave voĭsk 2 TA [Report on the material-technical supply of command and combat units of 2 Tank Army]’ (17 November 1944), Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 242, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 1, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136489800.

28 ‘Donesenie o boevom sostave soedineniĭ i chasteĭ 2 gv. TA [Report on the combat strength of formations and units of the 2 Guards Tank Army]’ (20 December 1944), Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 306, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 4, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112719686.

29 ‘Spravka o nalichii i sostoîanii materialʹnoĭ chasti tankov i SU 2 gv. TA po sostoîaniîu na 15 îanvarîa 1945 g. [Certificate of the presence and condition of the equipment of tanks and self propelled guns of 2 GTA as of January 15, 1945]’, 15 January 1945, Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 343, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 26, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=136535150..

30 ‘Ukomplektovannostʹ avtomashinami 2 gv. TA po sostoîaniîu na 6 îanvarîa 1945 goda [Staffing of motor vehicles 2 Gd Tank Army as of 6 January 1945]’, 8 January 1945, Fond 307, Opisʹ 4148, Delo 365, Dokument 42, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134676873.

31 ‘Raschet na peredislokatiîŝu 19 mbr [Calculation on the relocation of 19 Mech Bde]’, 29 December 1944, 2, Fond: 3334, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0004, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 139, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=452090342.

32 ‘Svedeniîa o nalichii materialʹnoĭ chasti, vooruzheniîa i lichnogo sostava 19 mbr [Information on the availability of the materiel, weapons and personnel 19 Mechanised Brigade]’, 10 January 1945, Fond: 3423, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0119, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 18, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=455020400.

33 ‘Vedomostʹ nalichiîa i ukomplektovannosti avtotransportom voĭskovykh chasteĭ i soedineniĭ 2 gv. TA [Statement of the availability and completeness of vehicles of military units and formations of 2 Guards Tank Army]’, 21 December 1944, Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 306, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 50, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=112719698.

34 ‘Vedomostʹ nalichiîa i tekhnicheskogo sostoîaniîa avtotransporta 7 gv. A [Statement on the availability and technical condition of vehicles of 7 Guards Army]’, 10 January 1945, Fond: 341, Opisʹ: 5312, Delo: 928, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 12, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133393423.

35 ‘Raschet na potrebnoe kolichestvo avtotransporta dlîa pod”ema lichnogo sostava, b/p, gsm, prodovolʹstviîa [Calculation of the required number of vehicles for the lifting of personnel, munitions, fuel and food.]’, 6 December 1944, Fond: 3413, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0084, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 359, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=450418262.

36 ‘Skhema postroeniîa avtomashin na marsh 27 gv. msbr [Scheme for allocating cars on the march of 27 Guards Motor Rifle Bde]’, 6 December 1944, Fond: 3413, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0084, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 367, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=450418269.

37 ‘Predvaritelʹnoe rasporîazhenie shtaba 26 msbr [Preliminary order from staff 26 Motor Rifle Brigade]’, 3 August 1944, Fond: 3376, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0011, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 59, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451530186.

38 Karta boevykh deĭstviĭ 2 gv. TA s 12.01.45 po 26.02.45 [Combat report map 2 Guards Tank Army 12 Jan to 26 Feb 1945], 12 January 1945, 12 January 1945, Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 332, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100915224; Otchetnaîa karta 2 gv. TA s 16.1 po 17.1.45. Varshavsko-Lodzinsko-Poznanʹskaîa operatiŝîa. Prilozhenie k delu № 41 [Reporting map 2 Guards Tank Army 16 to 17 January 1945. Warsaw-Lodz-Poznan operation. Annex to case № 41], 16 January 1945, 16 January 1945, Fond: 307, Opisʹ: 4148, Delo: 418, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100958912. The 22 daily report maps in the series are listed in the data appendix at https://www.hgwdavie.com/data-appendix

39 ‘Raschet na peredislokatiŝîu 19 mbr [Calculation on the relocation of 19 Mech Bde]’, table on page 2.

40 ‘Raschet na peredislokatiîŝu 19 mbr [Calculation on the relocation of 19 Mech Bde]’, 3.

41 ‘Raschet na perevozku lichnogo sostava i gruzov avtotransportom i na potrebnoe kolichestvo zh/d vagonov pod gruzy i lichnyĭ sostav, ne podnimaemye po fakticheskomu nalichiîu na 05.12.44 g. [Calculation on the transportation of personnel and goods by road and on the required number of railway wagons for cargo and personnel not lifted due to actual availability as of 05.12.44.]’, 5 December 1944, Fond: 3413, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0084, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 357, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=450418260.

42 ‘Raschet na potrebnoe kolichestvo avtotransporta dlîa pod”ema lichnogo sostava, b/p, gsm, prodovolʹstviîa [Calculation of the required number of vehicles for the lifting of personnel, munitions, fuel and food.]’.

43 ‘Skhema postroeniîa avtomashin na marsh 27 gv. msbr [Scheme for allocating cars on the march of 27 Guards Motor Rifle Bde]’.

44 ‘Svedeniîa o boevom i chislennom sostave i obespechennosti chasteĭ 27 gv. msbr po sostoîaniîu na 7.2.45 [Information about the combat and numerical strength of 27 Guards Motor Rifle Bde as of 7.2.45]’, 7 February 1945, Fond: 3378, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0020, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 71, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=451533209.

45 ‘Raschet na perevozku lichnogo sostava i gruzov avtotransportom po fakticheskomu nalichiîu [Calculation for the transportation of personnel and goods by road according to actual availability]’, 23 March 1945, Fond: 3413, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0100, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 146, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=454713358.

46 ‘Svedeniîa o boevom i chislennom sostave i obespechennosti chasteĭ 27 gv. msbr [Information about the combat and numerical strength and security of units of 27 Guards. Motor Rifle Brigade]’, 10 April 1945, Fond: 3413, Opisʹ: 0000001, Delo: 0100, List nachala dokumenta v dele: 153, TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=454713365.