The Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army— the Rear: High Mobility Through Limited Means

“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES: H. G. W. Davie (2020) The Logistics of the Combined-Arms Army— the Rear: High Mobility Through Limited Means, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 33:4, 580-607, Volume 33 Issue 3 on 14 December 2020, See the final published article here DOI: 10.1080/13518046.2020.1845091 If you have academic access please click on this link to record your readership of this article."

The author would like to thank the Russian Military Studies Archive, University of Cranfield, Defense Academy, Shrivenham, and David Glantz for their assistance in providing source material for this article.

Red Army Scouts before a mission behind enemy lines

Introduction

In the idea of the stability of the ‘Rear’ is included all that constitutes the life and activity
of the whole state-social system, politics, economy, apparatus of production, organization of the working people, ideology, science, art, morale of the people and other things.
(Voroshilov 1949)[1]

The concept of the ‘Rear’ is a particularly Soviet one, linking the supply and transportation of military forces with the national state, economy and people. Compared with the paucity of Western sources, there is an extensive Soviet historiography on the ‘Rear’, although this has quite a limited field of view, concentrating at national or front level with little discussion
on combined-arms armies or at divisional level. For instance, Military History Journal (VIZh) between 1964 and 1999 contained 110 articles on logistics subjects of which 12 were on tank armies, three on combined-arms armies, and only a single one on rifle divisions.[2] This latter article perfectly illustrates the dilemma facing Soviet historiography, as the author, Colonel N. Malyugin, chose to compare the 1941 rifle division (Shtat 04/400) with the 1945 one (Shtat 05/40) deployed against the Japanese, with barely a passing mention of what occurred in between and the word ‘horse’ used only once. As the 1945 division was the most heavily motorized wartime version, this allowed Malyugin to portray the Soviet Union as a modern and technologically advanced society.

With an almost total lack of coverage in either the published literature or periodicals about the rear of combined-arms armies, research must be concentrated on archival material and the private papers of the General Staff. Given this, the principal source on the rear of combined-arms armies is to be found in a series of seven articles in ‘Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War’[3] (Sbornik № 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 20). Further information can be gained from examples of front rear orders that can be found in other volumes and in the Collection of Military-Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War,[4] and Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War — volume 25(14): The Rear of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945.5 Similarly original documents and reports on the operation of the ‘Rear’ can be found from the Ministry of Defense archive through the pamyatnaroda.ru website, particularly for the 7th and 8th Guards Armies.

Structure and mechanism of the combined-arms army rear

The basic regulations for the operation of the rear of an army is given in Sbornik № 26 and that for the front in Sbornik № 4.[7]

Structure

The terrain under army command was divided into a number of areas and bounded on either side by inter-army boundaries and to the rear by the boundary with the front rear area. The 25 km behind the front line was evacuated of the civilian population with the troop rear running back 45 km from the front line, with the Divisional Exchange Point (DOP) about 15 km behind the front line or a day’s round trip for the horse-drawn regimental transport companies. The army rear area started from here back to the army base a distance of around 75–105 km or one day’s round trip for the army Separate Motor Transport Battalion (OATb).

The base would be located in a town with the army regulating station and ideally a railway line running forward to unloading stations (map symbol В/С) or supply stations (map symbol С/С) with one for every two-three rifle divisions. The link between the unloading stations and troop rear was by an army supply and evacuation route, which would be used by the divisional motor company (avtorota) if under 45 km or by the avtorota and OATb if over 45 km. The army rear area was crossed by the army military motor road (VAD), which connected base with troop area and any advanced army depots using the OATb.

The ‘First Echelon’ or command post was usually situated close to the VAD around 70 km behind the front, with the ‘Second Echelon’ or ‘Rear Command Post’ 15–20 km further to the rear. The troop area included the rear of the rifle divisions,8 which had three separate lines of connection between DOP and frontline units: munitions, medical, and supplies. The DOP contained field artillery, fuel and lubricants, intendant, food and fodder depots and avtorota route with the medical battalion close at hand. Supplies went to the anti-tank rifle company (8–12 km from the front), from there to three battalion intendant supply sections (5 km), and then onto three company supply sections (500 m). Medical supplies and evacuation went from the medical battalion to the regimental medical point (2–5 km), to three battalion medical stations (½–2 km), and finally to three field sanitary posts (500 m). Munitions went to the
regimental munitions point (5–10 km), to three battalion munitions points (2–5 km), and three company munitions points (500 m).

Units

The army possessed a wide array of rear installations to meet the needs of the combat troops:

  • Base with depots (artillery, fuel, armored vehicles, intendant, military-technical, sanitary, and veterinary), together with a working company for loading and unloading;

  • Supply stations with field depots (artillery, fuel, and rations/intendant) containing temporary reserves, an evacuation point, and field veterinary hospital. One station for every two–three rifle divisions with armored or cavalry formations;

  • Road operation and transport units

    • One–two road operation battalions (each served up to 250 km of road)

    • Two–three road construction battalions

    • One–two motor transport battalions

    • Three–five horse-drawn transport companies;

  • Repair units and workshops;

  • Bakeries;

  • Sanitary installations;

    • Field evacuation station

    • Two–three evacuation points

    • Six–eight mobile field hospitals

    • Three hospitals for lightly wounded

    • Two infectious disease hospitals

    • Separate motor medical company (ambulances)

    • Sanitary reinforcement company

    • Various laboratory, bath, laundry detachments

  • Veterinary installations; ○ Veterinary field hospitals ○ Veterinary evacuation hospitals ○ Various veterinary support units

  • Army reserve Rear units (for moving to a new base or during rapid advances);

  • NKVD to handle POW and rear area defense.

While the main group of depots was located at the base together with a field evacuation point and hospitals for the lightly wounded and ones for infectious diseases, advanced army depots (munitions, fuel, and rations) were based further forward around the second echelon command post 75 km behind the front, together with a forward field evacuation point, mobile field hospitals, and veterinary evacuation hospital. Scattered further forward were further mobile field hospitals and veterinary hospitals including in the troop area.

Stocks

Typically, an army maintained three levels of stocks: ‘maneuver’, ‘temporary’, and ‘mobile reserves’. The maneuver stocks depended on the operation and varied over the course of the war. However, five munitions load (boekomplekt), two refills of fuel (zapravki), and 20 days rations of food and fodder (s/dacha) was common. Advanced field depots would hold a temporary stock of one boekomplekt, two zapravki, and three–four s/dacha, while mobile reserves consisted of ¼ boekomplekt, one zapravki, and two s/dacha.

Marching column of Red Army troops, note how little equipment they carry, just a weapon, belt and rucksack (Veshmeshok)

Front

The task of the rear of the front was to receive materiel from the Center, collect local produce from the surrounding area, and recycle repaired and captured enemy equipment, which was then distributed between the armies or held as a reserve. These movements were controlled through front regulating stations, which directed the trains onward to the army regulating stations and formed a front base of depots, warehouse, repair shops, evacuation points, hospitals, and construction units gathered in the area around the regulating station. These typically contained one boekomplekt, five zapravki, and 10–15 s/dacha, which, considering that each front comprised between five to six armies, represented a considerable volume of supplies.

The front rear area was situated directly behind the army front area and extended 150–250 km further rearwards. This area was crossed by several railway lines and a number of front military roads that linked the front base to its constituent armies. These movements were controlled by the Chief of Military Communications (VOSO). The front could deliver supplies either to the army regulating station or directly to supply stations closer to the front line, while train-mounted workshops were posted at stations close to the front/army boundary to repair equipment.

In this respect, the front rear served the same purpose as the army rear but with two important exceptions. First, the front regulating station allowed the front command to support armies differentially, particularly favoring those that were conducting successful offensives. Second, front railway and road units together with national units provided by the People’s Commissariat of Transport (NKPS) and NKVD Main Directorate of State Highways (GUSHDOR) operated in both front and army rear areas. This allowed the front command to rebuild a secure supply route in the wake of an advance.

Mechanism

‘It’s all in the sequencing. If we can skip whatever we don’t absolutely need, turn things on in the right order . . . ’ In the movie Apollo 13, astronaut Ken Mattingly, working in a simulator, has to find a way of starting up the stricken space capsule using less power than it takes to run a coffee pot. He succeeds by turning on systems in a particular sequence, as some functions, such as warming the parachutes, drew a lot of power and then turned themselves off, allowing the start of another function. This is a good analogy for the supply system of an army, as with only one OATb (capacity 300 tons) supplying seven rifle divisions over a distance of 75 km with a demand of 700 tons a day, it was impossible to run a Western-style supply system with convoys of lorries bringing up supplies from a distant railhead to depots from where they were collected by divisional motor columns.

This became especially clear from 1943 onwards, when responsibility for delivering munitions and fuel from the railhead to the DOP was given to the army transport, leaving the avtorota to collect food and fodder. Instead, when the army was on the defensive or during the offensive preparatory period, rifle division avtorota were given over to army transport duties, leaving the rifle divisions to rely on their horse-drawn transport. This increased the size of the army transport to over 465 vehicles (45 cargo lorries per avtorota [Shtat 04/559]9 ) of around 700t load and allowed it sufficient capacity to both supply daily needs and build up depots and army exchange points close behind the DOP, around 15 km behind the front line. Typically, these held ¾ of the entire stock of materiel needed for the duration of the offensive and allowed delivery of the large stocks of artillery munitions required for the opening bombardment directly to the artillery positions.

Just before the start of the offensive, the avtorota were returned to their divisions so that they could bring forward supplies from the DOP and depots during the attack and return with wounded to first aid posts. The OATb would continue to bring forward vital supplies from the main depots and even the base. The opening three or four days of the offensive would see the divisions fighting close to theirs stocks of supplies. However, once the German line had been broken and local counter-attacks were defeated, the army would embark on a pursuit that was expected to carry it over 150 km from the front line and their depots — a two-day round trip for the avtorota.

So the advance depended on the troop’s unit transport carrying the bulk of its supplies with it, adhering to strict rules on carrying nothing except munitions, fuel, and food and fodder, while both divisional and army transport focused on meeting critical shortages, especially in the inevitable battle at the end of the pursuit to capture the next German operational line of defense. Increasingly as the war continued, the front transport reserves were used to reinforce armies on the breakthrough axis of advance. However, these formations had the greatest demands and were expected to travel the furthest distances. Moreover, this help in the second period might only amount to one extra motor transport battalion and in the third period might be as many as three battalions, neither of which was going to alter the overall dynamics of the system.

The consequences and limitations of this system were that the scope and extent of the offensive was determined largely by what the divisions could carry on their troop transport or could reasonably be expected to capture, unless railway lines could be opened up to even limited traffic. One railway train with 650 tons load could keep the army moving forward for a day, and if it could unload within 75 km of the front line, motor transport could move it forward the rest of the way. A major role of front transport was to help bridge any gaps in the railway system — blown bridges, besieged towns, and the like — so that trains could be run as far forward as possible, even if a direct, continuous, through service was impossible.

Evolution of the rear

The basic structure of the army and front rear laid out in Sbornik № 2 and № 4 represented their state from late 1941 onward, which was fundamentally sound and continued to the end of the war with only a limited evolution. So the articles in Sbornik № 5, 7, 8, and 9 highlight aspects of specific types of operations to address shortcomings and accounts for the lack of articles after December 1943, as rear commanders became increasingly competent, until conclusions were drawn at the end of the war in Sbornik № 20.

The original description of army railway stations lists a complex arrangement running across the rear area, typically as was found during the Battle of Moscow, when the Red Army was operating in an area of densely packed railway lines close to the capital. However, later operations had to operate out in the country, where railway lines were sparse and an army might consider itself lucky if it had a single line serving the army base. So usage changed and terms such as army regulating station were dropped with only supply stations retained. This had practical consequences, as the full weight of supply between the army base and the forward depots fell onto the army transport.

While the inherent organization might be sound, problems of competence remained of both 1st and 2nd echelon staffs.10 This lack of experience was starkly illustrated between December 1941 and May 1942 by the Crimean Front in Sbornik № 5,11 where an amphibious operation ran into serious supply difficulties, while the Main Directorate of the Rear failed to respond quickly and the situation was only stabilized once General A. V. Khrulev, Chief Intendant of the Red Army, made a personal visit in late February 1942.

A.V. Khrulev

First period of the war

Defensive operations: Summer of 1942 [12]

The story of the 38th Army illustrates the way in which the Red Army sought to reduce demand on the NKPS and Center by utilizing local production on quiet sections of the front. In Sbornik № 8, 4th Reserve Army of the Bryansk Front (July 1942), which became 38th Army and from September was assigned to the Voronezh Front, ultimately comprised five rifle divisions, four rifle brigades, 8th Cavalry Corps, and three tank brigades with 10 artillery regiments.

The depth of the army reached 130 km (45 km troop area and 85 km army rear area), with a railway line running across the back of the area from Gryazi through the army regulating station at Lipetsk, through Sintovo (where a 1-km branch line led to the fuel and air force depots), through Patriarshaya (a 1.5-km branch line serviced intendant [food and fodder], artillery [munitions], motor, and armored depots) to Yelets, a distance of 120 km. From Yelets, a branch line ran forward along the western boundary of the army to an unloading station for fuel and rations at Ulusarka (65 km from the front line) and another for munitions at Khitovo (55 km from the front line) to Dolgorukovo (35 km from the front line), an unloading station shared with the neighboring army. A VAD followed the same path as the railway as far as Ulusarka, where it turned south to Dolgusha (35 km from the front line), which serviced the western side of the army, and a series of army supply routes serviced the eastern side of the army from Lipetsk, coming as near as 35 km to the front line.

From November, a shared railway line to the east of the 38th Army boundary was used to bring supplies to an unloading station at Ramon with a 30-km journey to the troops. The 400 km of roads were operated by a single road-operating battalion and a single road-construction battalion. Usually, these units would service 250 km of roads. However, the stationary position of the army allowed them time to metal most of the distance and to recruit local populations to maintain the majority of road sections, so that the roads were in good order throughout muddy and winter seasons.

Army transport consisted of a single OATb with an establishment of 145 vehicles, of which 110 were available for operations, comprising 2.5t ZIS-5 and 2t Fords (a capacity around 275 tons), and there were probably the usual three companies of 185 horse-drawn wagons to move supplies around the army base. It is possible to gauge the daily demand that had to be carried forward from the unloading stations by referring to the example of the 51st Army,13 which needed 856,6 tons (0.25 boekomplekt, 0.3 zapravki, 1 s/dacha, and 200 tons other supplies) and which was a slightly smaller force. To deliver this amount along the railway line would take two trains, which was perfectly possible, even though the line was shared with the neighboring army. The unloading stations were situated 65 km from the front line, of which the first 15 km from front line to DOP was serviced by horse-drawn troop transport, leaving 50 km to be covered by army transport. This would clearly need 3.5 round trips; the lorries could drive 1.5 round trips a day, so even this short distance exceeded the capacity of army transport. Of course, the divisional avtorota could be drafted in to help, and the best way of solving this differential equation is to note that generally avtorota provided enough lift to move half the daily supplies of the division and so could supply it out to a range of 35 km. This left the army transport to cover the final 15 km, which it could just manage with 3.5 round trips (150 km/7 = 21 km).

However, in the case of the 38th Army, all the unloading stations were situated on the western boundary, and units on the eastern boundary had a journey of over 70 km to make from their DOP to the unloading station (or 35 km for army transport), which meant that overall, the army was short of transport. Finally, in November a shared railway line to Ramon, 25 km outside the eastern boundary, was made available to service the eastern troops, a distance that their avtorota could manage. This was especially important since October, as 35 lorries of the OATb were detached to Tambov to collect potatoes, 25 were being used to move the harvest further to the rear, and 25–30 lorries were assigned to deliver munitions, leaving just 20–25 vehicles to deliver rations for the entire army.

The 38th Army, in an effort to make its demand fit the transport fleet, sought to harvest food and fodder from the surrounding farmland. This was not brigandage. Instead, it was a carefully managed utilization of the local civil authorities and the existing agricultural networks covering five local districts. By the end of August, the local population had been evacuated from a 15-km zone behind the front line and were organized into brigades to conduct the harvest, and soldiers were drafted from stationary units to help, with military transport being used to haul the produce away and to recover abandoned farm machinery. Any parts of the landscape under enemy observation were harvested at night, and the army drew on the production of the 15-km zone for stocks of meat, grain, and salt. There was a shortage of oats due to a lack of local supplies, yet plenty of hay and straw, and vegetables were collected from Tambov, 130 km to the east.

By the middle of December, the army was able to create a six-week reserve of 1,500 tons of flour utilizing the mills in Lipetsk. However, there were insufficient stocks of meat locally, so over 900 cattle were driven 400–500 km over the course of a month to supply the 250–300 tons of meat needed monthly. The military effort in local agriculture tied up 500 personnel yet freed up valuable railway capacity, even though it cost 2 zapravki a month in gasoline.

The inability of 38th Army to supply itself more than 75 km (15 km by troop transport, 35 km by avtorota, and 20 km by OATb) beyond a railhead even when stationary and on the defensive in 1942, illustrates the difficulties that would face the Red Army when it went over to the offensive in the winter of 1942 and begs the question: How was it going to achieve greater mobility?

Offensive operations: Winter of 1942–43

By 1943, the rear of the Soviet field armies had evolved further. Here, the example of the 21st Army’s (South West Front) offensive against the Romanian Vth corps of the 3rd Army defending the flank north of Stalingrad14 in December 1942 is used. The South West Front depended on one double-tracked railway line, which also partially served the Don Front and operated with a front regulating station at Povorino, which directed an average of 12 trains a day in support of 5th Tank and 21st and 65th Armies. It was made up of 26,203 operational and 6,161 supply wagons between 19 November and 31 December.[15]

The 21st Army’s VOSO Department had Regulating Station Command № 40 at Sebryakovo, the army base, with secondary unloading Supply Station Commands № 48 at Rakovka and № 50 at Panfilovo. The army had a VAD running south 90 km from the station to the front, with a 75-km branch running south-west and a 20-km connecting road operated by the motor-road service, which deployed the 515th OATb and the 1st company from the 37th OATb for transport duties and the 85th Road Operation Battalion, 161st Road Construction Battalion, 141st Bridge Construction Battalion, and four horse-drawn transport companies. The roads were fully equipped with food and rest stops, refueling posts, technical assistance posts, and tractors for recovery, and assistance with snow clearance was obtained from the collective farms along the route.

The army headquarters was 20 km from the station with the 2nd echelon headquarters 5 km away. The 21st Army rear consisted of Army Base № 25 with a depot for artillery, food, clothing, fuel, veterinary, trophy, motorarmored, military-technical, six workshops, four bakeries, 10 herds of cattle, two armored repair and recovery battalions, a mobile repair base, and assembly point for damaged vehicles (SPAM). The sanitary service had seven mobile field hospitals, one army field hospital, two infection hospitals, a medical reinforcement company, epidemic detachment, bath company, pathology laboratory, one motor ambulance company and one horse-drawn, three laundry detachments, three sanitary posts, and the veterinary service had two army vets. It also had hospitals and two evacuation hospitals.

The depots were largely housed in the villages around the unloading stations together with four field, one infection, and one army hospital and the workshops. A second grouping of services was positioned halfway down the VAD with three field hospitals, three veterinary hospitals, two bakeries, SPAM, and vehicle workshops. At the far end of the VAD were two army exchange points (AOP-1 & AOP-2) to handle munitions and food, alongside the divisional DOP 15–20 km behind the front line and 75–90 km from the stations. The Front aimed to accumulate supplies of two boekomplekt, two zapravki, and eight days s/dacha at the DOPS, 0.5 boekomplekt, one zapravki, and five s/dacha at the AOPs and 0.5 boekomplekt, two zapravki, and seven s/ dacha at the army depot. The weight of the supplies needed at the DOP and AOP for the offensive was 12,882.6 tons (5,421 t = 2.5 boekomplekt, 5451.6 t = 13 s/dacha, and 2,010 t = 5 zapravki.)

At this point in the war, divisional transport was expected to collect day-today supplies from the army depots if under 75 km away,16 and army transport was expected to build up reserves at the AOP. The nine rifle divisions each had an avtorota of 59 trucks (Shtat 04/300) or 49 trucks (Shtat 04/550) to accomplish this, and the distance allowed one round journey a day. The army 515th OATb had 119 running lorries (228t), 1st company 37th OATb had 22 running lorries (41t), and for the operation it was loaned three OATb RVGK (STAVKA Reserve) with 124 running lorries (225t). The 343t of lift available was insufficient to move the 12,882t of supplies forward the 90 km to the DOP and AOP by itself, given the poor condition of the vehicles and the winter conditions. So 629 additional vehicles (probably using the avtorota of the rifle divisions) were taken from troop units for five days starting from 15 November. Between them, this fleet moved 5,694t (44.2 percent of what was planned) between 5 November to 19 November, which left the army short of its planned level of supplies for the forthcoming offensive with 1.7 boekomplekt, 2.2 zapravki, and 5.0 s/dacha or 6,668t.

The offensive lasted from 19 to 25 November, during which time the 21st Army including the 4th Tank Corps and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps expended 0.7 boekomplekt (1,650t), 1.82 zapravki (730t), and 7 s/dacha (2,850t). The scale of supplies brought forward from the base to the AOP was 780t munitions, 115t fuel, and 382t rations, of which only 556.8t was carried by army transport, which also had to keep the tank units supplied with fuel. The essential dilemma facing the 21st Army was that it only had sufficient transport to perform one task at a time, either build up supplies or to move forward. This was a function of the size of its transport fleet and starting the offensive close to the maximum distance from its railhead, so that when the advance started, the army would have to mainly live off the supplies gathered at the DOP and AOP. It could then move forward for five days, up to 75 km, and draw supplies from the exchange points before the offensive faltered with supplies being drawn from the railhead, a round trip of 300 km or two days’ journey. To sustain further advances, railway lines would be needed.

Red Army scouts on patrol in winter

Second period of the war

Sbornik № 9 summary of the rear in offensive

The early experience gained in 1941–42 informed the summer campaign of 1943 onward and allowed the establishment of norms of operation. It was established that there was a ‘strict correlation between the rates of offensive and the means of transport . . . combined with the maximum possible recovery rates of railways and dirt roads destroyed by the enemy, are a prerequisite for the uninterrupted provision of an offensive operation’.[17]

A combined-arms army consisted of six–eight rifle divisions, 10–15 artillery regiments, and a tank corps and conducted a 10–15-day offensive operation to a depth of 100–120 km. The offensive was divided into three periods: a period of preparation that lasted two to 10 days, during which time the motor transport had to bring forward the supplies from the railway unloading stations to the DOP. The example given was 1,000t to replenish the mobile reserves of the troops, plus 3,500t to meet their daily demand, plus 10,000t of artillery munitions for the artillery bombardment, giving a total of 14,500t or 1,450t a day over a distance of 30–40 km from the unloading station to DOP or artillery fire positions. The army OATb had 140 ZIS-5 lorries of 2.5t load and could make two round trips a day, delivering 700t a day. The troops had 300 transport vehicles with 200 additional ones arriving with fresh troops, and so 150 could be withdrawn for 10 days. The breakthrough of the tactical zone envisaged an initial artillery preparation using 1 to 2.5 boekomplekt, from a stock of two–three boekomplekt, while the troops might use 1 to 2.5 boekomplekt during the breakthrough battle and have a daily demand of 0.25–0.5 boekomplekt, 0.5 zapravki, and one s/dacha.

A feature of this period was the congestion of roads behind the advance with the attacking units, 2nd echelon troops, supporting artillery, all marching forward mingled with rear units down a single dirt road. The support provided by army transport during the 10-day operation envisaged a demand of four boekomplekt (12,000t), five zapravki (1,200t), and 10 s/dacha (2,000t) (this amount includes the artillery preparation stock, as the troop average would be one boekomplekt), a total of 15,200t of mobile reserves, of which 10,000t was delivered during the preparation period. This left 520t to be transported daily or 205 ZIS-5 lorries over a distance of 75 km for days 1-4 with an advance rate of 10 km a day (30 km from the unloading station to the divisional exchange point plus 40 km advance.) From day 5, every day would add 10 km to the journey out to 130 km, so additional help would be required from divisional transport (at 130 km, 410 lorries would be needed, which would be the majority of the transport fleet).

The period of exploitation saw the troops advancing at 10 km a day with heavy use of vehicles on dirt roads to connect the troops with their depots as ‘the army must maintain freedom of maneuver; the rear of the army should be unloaded from everything that it does not need for combat missions’. However, reduced enemy resistance saw a fall in daily demand to 0.1 boekomplekt, 0.2–0.5 zapravki, and one s/dacha, which can be calculated at 980t a day, the majority of which was either carried by the units or was at their DOP. The rear sought to advance the base and transfer to a new railway line, with similar changes to evacuation routes, methods of delivery, a reorganization of main depots, and an increasing “release of munitions and other supplies to troops of one military unit at expense of another” to reinforce success.

Belgorod-Kharkov Strategic Offensive Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Up to now, the focus has been on the General Staff’s own view on logistics, yet it is possible to study actual historical examples using the original documents and contemporary reports found in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defence Russian Federation (TsAMO RF). The first example, from the second period, is the 7th Guards Army’s (7GA) Belgorod-Kharkov Offensive from 3 to 23 August 1943. The main Soviet offensive was launched southwards by the 5th and 6th Guards Armies of the Voronezh front,18 from positions north and west of Belgorod, against the 332, 167, and 168 Infanterie Divisionen19 (ID) and was followed by 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies. In support, the Steppe Front launched an attack against Belgorod with the 53rd and 69th Armies and 1st Mechanized Corps, and in turn this was supported by the attack of the 7GA across the river, south of the city.

This is important, because neither the Steppe Front nor 7GA were launching attacks along the main direction, with all the complications of accompanying 2nd echelon units. So 7GA and the supporting armies to the south launched their attack unsupported by front assistance, which was committed to the armies attacking Belgorod. As far as possible, this is a case of an army launching an offensive using only its own resources — a clear and simple example to study. The offensive was launched on 3 August by 49th Rifle Corps20 against the southern flank of the 198. ID, and by 8 August 7GA had completely forced the Germans away from the river, pushing them southwards, reaching Kharkov on the 9th and being well past it on the southern side by the 11th.

Organisation of the Rear of 7 Guards Army 8 August 1943

Steppe Front.

The report of the rear of the Steppe Front21 shows that it deployed four armies (53rd, 69th, 47th, and 7th Guards), three artillery, two ration, two fuel, two intendant, one chemical protection, one engineer, and one explosives depots around the front regulating station at Liski, and it sent five surgical mobile field hospitals, one to each army, including the 5th Guards Tank Army. In total, the front had 16,406 vehicles (61 percent establishment) and 1,675 tractors (78 percent establishment), and it was joined during the operation by an additional five OATb (748 vehicles) from STAVKA reserves, giving two battalions to 53rd and one to 69th Army, keeping two in reserve with a fuel company. It had 15,050 vehicles in four combined-arms armies, a front reserve of 478 and 98 fuel vehicles with a capacity of 180t (0.12 zapravki).

As far as supply was concerned, the front specified that the following reserves should be kept in the armies, as shown in Table 1.

Food stocks were sufficient for both men and horses to meet these requirements, and there were plenty of field kitchens and intendant stocks, the principal issue being the lack of transport to move these items forward when needed. Railways and roads (VAD).

During the operation, the command was confronted by the fact that the railways largely ran north–south, while the direction of the operation ran south–west. The way that this was resolved was that one railway line was used to support all the armies of the front, and then when it had advanced far enough forward to warrant a shift of the bases, this line was replaced by the next parallel line to the west, again supplying a line of bases running north–south. The Steppe front used the railways of the Moscow–Donbass line with its front regulating station at Liski, using the main line running 165 km south–west to Valuiki. At this junction, it turned north onto the main line running 40 km to the 7GA base at Vololkonovka using excellent lines that had formerly been part of the Donbass–Moscow–Leningrad Coal Magistrale, which could carry 12 trains a day.[22] When it advanced sufficiently toward Kharkov, the trains simply continued on the main line past Valuiki onto Kupyansk junction, where they turned north onto a branch line that ran up toward Belgorod to the new unloading station at Volchansk or west onto another branch line that ran toward Kharkov.

There were 515 km of front and 360 km of army roads, with five front roads, three of which connected Valuiki with the army bases; the other two connected Belgorod with Kharkov. These were all dirt roads with a speed of 40 kmph and bridges up to 60 tons, which were quite usable during dry weather yet presented difficulties with any kind of rain.

Overall communications presented difficulties, as the limited number of railway lines were overloaded by supplying three fronts and two tank armies on two railway lines, and these units were short of transport, being considerably under establishment in both motor vehicles and horse-drawn wagons. The medical services were short of hospital units, under-staffed, and lacked transport, a situation mirrored by the veterinary service, which had to move closer to the front to make up for the lack of evacuation centers.

7 Guards Army Establishment

The army combat establishment[23] is shown in Table 2, together with the total number of personnel[24] at the start of the offensive. These units possessed the following numbers of weapons: mortars: 423 of 82 mm, 144 of 120 mm; guns: 50 of 152 mm, 76 of 122 mm, 216 of 76 mm DA, 78 of 76 mm PA, 250 of 45 mm at; anti-aircraft guns: 89; tanks: 9 KV-1, 41 T-34, 8 T-60, 6 Mk2, 8 Mk3, 3 SU-122, and 4 SU-76. Unfortunately, there is no report for 3 August showing the deployment of units of the army rear. However, there are reports for 1 June, 15 June, 20 July, 25 and 22 December 1943, and a comparison of these shows little or no change over the entire period with the sole exception of the addition of 841st OATb on 20 July. This unit was loaned from the Voronezh Front and would be withdrawn when the 7GA was transferred to the Steppe Front before the offensive, so to counter the loss the army was forced to create an ad hoc unit from artillery troop transport with a capacity of 150 tons.[26]

Similarly, the best report on the establishment of rear personnel dates from 22 December,[27] which shows both authorized and actual strength, again with little change from the summer. So a reasonable estimate of the rear is shown in Table 3 using the 20 July report for units and 22 December report for numbers of personnel. The total of rear personnel (22 December) came to 6,463, of whom 1,473 were women, with an establishment total of 6,982. In August, the total would be slightly larger as it included rear units for tank units.

A complete inventory of the vehicles available to every unit in the army and their type is shown in the report of 15 May28 in Table 4, which shows motor units — 218 vehicles, medical and veterinary — 209, depots, workshops, and bases — 282, headquarters and offices — 78. The largest users were the 835th Separate Staff Motor Platoon — 62 vehicles, 97th Separate Ambulance Company — 59, 34th Separate Repair and Recovery Battalion — 56, and a fuel platoon — 24; units such as the 157th Field Bakery had to make do with just two GAZ-AA and one ZIS-5 lorry, and the 47th Army Base had only one captured car.

This picture can help inform the figures gained from the ‘Material on the Work of the Motor Department and Its Units’,29 which are displayed in Table 5. In August, the army possessed 71 percent of its establishment with 2,160 domestic, 632 captured, and 445 imported vehicles. However, only 67 percent of these were running, less than half the establishment figure. Non-domestic manufactured vehicles remained around 30 percent of the fleet, and it can be assumed that, as before, imported vehicles were concentrated in artillery and tank units and trophy vehicles in rear units.

So on the eve of the offensive, 7GA mustered 62,000 personnel, 987 artillery pieces, 79 operational tanks, 5,885 horses, and 2,158 vehicles, which gave a ratio of 11 men per horse and 24 men per vehicle, which indicates that it was seriously short of transport by even the meager Soviet standards.

Demand, weights, and measures

The daily demand of the army for rations for man and horse, fuel for the vehicles, and munitions for the guns was a constant worry for the 2nd echelon staff. They kept track of this consumption by calculating boekomplekt, zapravki, and s/dacha for the stocks held with the troops and at the army base and the daily consumption for different types of operations. A report from 2 June[30] gave stocks of one boekomplekt (3,615t), one zapravki (307t), one s/dacha (237t), a total of 4,159 tons, and calculated a daily demand when stationary of 0.2 zapravki (43.8t) and one s/dacha (237t), a total of 281t, which increased for operations to 0.1–0.2 boekomplekt (362–720t), 0.4 zapravki (87.6t), and one s/ dacha (237t) for a total of 687–1,045t. Another estimate put normal operations at 0.2 boekomplekt (600t), 0.2 zapravki (55t), and 1 s/dacha (120t), a total of 775t.[31] A similar figure had been compiled on 4 June using 0.25 boekomplekt (515t), 0.25 zapravki (77t), and one s/dacha (238t), a total of 830t,[32] while similar calculations on 2 August put one zapravki at (334t) and one s/dacha (198t)[33] and for 2 September one zapravki (334t) and one s/dacha (162t).[34] These figures would allow 2.65 kg of rations per man, 5.8 kg of oats per horse, and 82 kg of gasoline (approximately 25 gallons) per vehicle. Knowing the weight of an army refill, it is possible to estimate the kind of loads that needed to be moved forward from the railway stations for a 10-day operation as shown in Table 6. [35]

In the ‘Operational Orientation of the Rear’ report of 5 August,[36] the 2nd echelon staff calculated the lift available to the army, which is shown in Table 7.

To this was added the work of the troops’ horse-drawn transport (50 percent of establishment), which carried 700 tons of cargo and raised the troop transport total to 4,092 tons of lift. It should be noted that this represented virtually every vehicle in the army and that once operations commenced, only the avtorota could be relied on for the carriage from the rear, and these numbered around 700 vehicles. However, the army OATb by itself could only move 350t, which was sufficient to deliver little more than one s/dacha and only a little ammunition, while the fuel platoon could deliver 0.2 zapravki. The army would need to be within 45 km of the army base for the OATb to meet the entire demand, otherwise some use of troop transport was inevitable.

Taking the planned allowances from the Steppe Front report shown in Table 1 and using the aforementioned refill figures for 5 August (albeit with the fodder allocation from 2 August), the planned available stocks at different locations can be estimated as shown in Table 8.

This meant that with the army transport fulfilling the day-to-day demand for fuel and rations, and using all the troop transport, it would take a minimum of three days to deliver all the stocks to the DOP and the AOP at a distance of 90 km or four days at 120 km. In reality, with armies needing to conduct operations during the buildup for offensives, only part of the troop transport was available, and hence the buildup period could easily last 10 days or more.

Deployment

Since distance was such an important factor in the operation of the rear, an understanding of the layout of the army is required. There are five sources describing this, two maps showing rear installations on 8 August[37] and 13 August, and the reports ‘Operational Orientation and Situation of Rear Units 5 August’,[38] the ‘Department of the Rear of the 7th Guards Army’,[39] and the ‘Maneuvering the means of transport — Kharkov-Belgorod operation”[40] together with several situation maps.41 These show that the distance between the frontline troops along the Siverskyi Donets and the base at Volokonovka was 90 km in a direct line and 130 km by road. With DOP 5 km behind the river, this distance exceeded the capacity of army transport to support and forced the establishment of forward depots, which shortened the distance to under 55 km.

The base at Volokonovka was serviced by a series of railway stations on either side of the town over a distance of 20 km, while all the main depots were based in or around the center. The base was commanded by 47th Field Management and serviced by both 200th and 36th Separate Operations Companies, and local haulage was provided by 326th Horse-Drawn Transport Company; 185th OATb operated from there. Five hospitals were located along the railway line with 24th Field Evacuation Point based in the town to pass wounded onto the front facilities. The 2nd echelon command post was based 35 km away at Popobka, about 50 km from the front line, and a whole host of facilities were based along the next 10 km of military road running toward the troops.

There were fuel, rations, artillery, and sanitary forward depots; three hospitals; 97th Ambulance and 251st Horse-drawn Ambulance Companies; 111st Bath and Fumigation Company; 534th Field Bakery; the 22nd Road Operation Battalion; the workshops of the 37th Mobile Repair Base; and two veterinary hospitals. This marked the line between the rear and the troop areas with further hospitals and depots scattered forward across the troop area, focused around roads and railway lines or based just behind the DOP.

The course of the operation

The 7GA attack was a success, largely because the main part of the offensive had already outflanked the German 198.ID to the west. The army advanced at a steady 15 km a day and by 13 August had covered 70 km to the outskirts of Kharkov, passing to the south of the city. The five-day stocks held at the DOP were sufficient to support the initial artillery strike, the breakthrough battle, and the initial stage of the exploitation phase, during which demand fell to 700 tons a day, enabling the avtorota to deliver this up to 45 km, with two journeys a day, while the army transport could replenish the DOP with a day’s supply by traveling the 50 km forward from the army forward depots. Yet this situation was not sustainable for an advance exceeding 70 km and lasting more than 10 days. So on 12 August, by Army Order № 006, the army base was shifted forward some 70 km to Volchansk, which fortunately only required use of railway lines already under Soviet control. The main depots remained in Volokonovka with 200th Operations Company, while the 2nd echelon command post, 36th Operations Company, the forward depots, and all the support units moved forward to Volchansk by road, carried by the 185th OATb, a move helped by the fact that the depots were by now largely empty. At the same time, the road units extended the military road closer toward Kharkov, and the DOP moved forward 30–50 km following the advancing troops.[42]

By 15 August, the entire base had become established in Volchansk[43] when the main depots moved forward by rail and supplies started to flow into the town. There was a constant process of moving forward, as by the end of the month, new forward depots would be established in the town of Chuhuiv, 20 km south-east of Kharkov, which was served by a new military road and rail connections. The result of all this effort can be seen in the ‘Summary of Material Support to the Formations and Units of the 7GA’,44 which provides reports for almost every day of the offensive, for individual units, covering a wide array of commodities. From this it can be seen that there were no real shortages during the course of the offensive in ammunition, fuel, or basic foodstuffs, although individual items such as meat were not supplied to the rifle divisions, despite a limited inventory in the stock at the army base. Some stocks varied widely between different units.

For instance, the 73rd Guards Rifle Division (GRD) only had oats for its horses on four days for the first half of August, the 81st GRD had over 10 s/dacha at the start of the month and never fell below 1.6, and the stock at the base started at 26 s/dacha and never fell below 14. Other items such as hay for the horses was simply stored and never touched, the 36th GRD had a stock of 401 s/dacha that never altered and this was not exceptional, the 15th GRD held 110 s/ dacha, and the 72nd GRD 98 s/dacha, which was plainly stock built up for winter feed. Interestingly, the base only held small stocks of 1.9 s/dacha, which meant that despite fodder being a very bulky material, it was moved by road and probably collected locally

Rear of 7 Guards Army moves forward after the offensive

The third period of the war

Vistula-Oder Strategic Offensive

While the first and second periods demonstrated the constraints imposed on the combined-arms armies by their horse-drawn unit transport, shortage of motor transport, and reliance on railways to provide operational mobility, the third period of the war showed the combined-arms armies increasingly able to maintain advances over greater distances and for longer durations and at the same time able to mount offensives more frequently. One of the best examples of this was the 8th Guards Army (8GA) during the Vistula-Oder offensive of January 1945.

The army attacked out of the constrained Magnuszew bridgehead alongside the 5th Shock Army, on the Vistula river against the German 9. Armee, which promptly collapsed under the weight of the attack. This allowed the two tank armies to conduct their breakout unscathed and advance into the depths of the interior. The original planning[45] had envisaged an operation similar in scale and tempo to the previous summer’s Operation Bagration with a 10-day advance of 15 km a day, with the 8GA advancing 150 km to capture the town of Lodz and a distant objective of Posen 340 km away. Instead, the army conducted a rapid advance, capturing Lodz on 19 January (D+6) and attacking Festplatz Posen on the 25 January (D+12). The final advance carried the front to the Oder and formed a bridgehead around Kustrin, over 550 km from the starting point.

Given this impressive performance, what had changed between August 1943 and January 1945?

Vistula-Oder Offensive January 1945

1st Belorussian Front

By the start of 1945, the 1st Belorussian Front had become a powerful force, comprising seven combined-arms armies, two tank armies, and an air army, a force that numbered over a million men. In terms of vehicles, it deployed 62,750 vehicles, with 55,600 in combat units (including 20,000 tractors), 3,220 in front reserve, and 3,920 in army transport.[46] This would give each of the combined-arms armies around 2,500–4,000 vehicles (attacking ones had more artillery and hence more vehicles) 9,000 with each of the tank armies, 4,000 with the air army, 3,000 with the breakthrough artillery units, and 7,000 transport vehicles.[47] The front regulating stations were at Brest and Kovel with a large group of front depots at Brest (two artillery, rations, fuel, and clothing). Front headquarters were at Miedzyrzec, with another large group of depots at Siedlce and small groups of depots at Deblin, Lublin, and along the railway line linking Siedlce and Warsaw. Supplies flowed along the main double-tracked railway from Pinsk to Brest to Warsaw (24 pairs of trains a day) and the southern route of Kovel, Lublin, and Warsaw (18 pairs). It was along this line, running along the banks of the Vistula, that the army bases were located. The depth of the front was 200–250 km, army depth 80–130 km, and the army bases were 25 km away from the bridgeheads in a crowded area along the railway line. The front aimed to store sufficient fuel for the entire operation, assuming a maximum penetration of 350 km with a duration of 20 days, and by the operation’s start had a total of 54,989 tons in front reserve. Since the supply of fuel was going to be an important factor in the operation, it is worthwhile examining this in detail as shown in Table 9. [48]

Essentially, high octane and B-70 were used in aircraft, KB-70 in light tanks, gasoline in vehicles, naptha and kerosene in tractors, and diesel in tanks, so the greatest weight would have to be moved the shortest distance, from the railway to the airfields; the troops would be using under 32,000 tons on military vehicles. As a guide, 0.2 zapravki provided a day’s worth of fuel, so the troops were carrying 10–14 days of fuel, and the army held an additional 5–7 days. However, the rapid advance seen during this operation might use as much as 0.5 zapravki a day, so these stocks might only last 5–7 days. In addition, the troops carried a five s/dacha and army depots held a 20 s/dacha, although weights would be higher than normal, as this was January and the horses would need to be fed a hay ration in addition to their normal oats.[49]

Railways and roads (VAD)

All the main railway lines had been converted to Union gauge along the main lines, as this area of Eastern Poland had been captured in August 1944, so there were no delays from trans-shipment, and the railways transported 673 trains of operational cargo (men and equipment), 109 trains of munitions, 56 trains of fuel, 138 trains of food and fodder, 283 trains of other cargoes, for a total of 1,259 trains, or 68,461 wagons, or around 522,000 tons of supplies during the buildup. To support the forthcoming offensive, it was decided that the advance would continue using standard-gauge track on the far side of the Vistula, so large trans-shipment stations were constructed at Deblin and Warsaw to connect the two systems. Also, engineering support for the railways had increased from the beginning of 1943, with the number of railway troops rising from 196,000 personnel in 1943 to 253,000 by 1945,50 and the front had deployed three railway brigades (16,500 personnel) in June 1944 and now deployed four railway brigades (26,000 personnel) in its area.

The front had two VAD, and 8GA had three roads of only 25–40 km length due to the proximity of the army bases to the bridgeheads. This was maintained by road construction battalions numbering 24,000 personnel, 344 cars, 287 tractors, 6,100 horses, 2,930 vehicles, 36 diesel pile drivers, and 15 frames. The 8GA bridgehead only had vehicular pontoon bridges connecting it with the far bank, and all the main railway bridges over the Vistula at Magnuszew, Deblin, or Warsaw were either in German hands or destroyed.

8th Guards Army establishment

The army consisted of 10 rifle divisions, 99 artillery regiments, 11 armored regiments, and an engineer-sapper brigade,51 with a strength as shown in Table 10. [52]

A further breakdown on the vehicle numbers can be gained from the consumption report of artillery units,53 which shows that there were 434 vehicles and 27 tractors in the rifle division artillery regiments and 2,671 vehicles and 345 tractors in army artillery and air defense (PVO) units, which meant that artillery vehicles accounted for approximately 70 percent of all the transport.

The rear of the army comprised, on 6 December, № 83 Army Base (with three labor companies and one battalion) with 14 depots; two VOSO supply stations (Sobolev and Laskazhev); two road operation, two road construction,and one bridge construction battalions; supported by two horse-drawn transport companies. The intendant service had three bakeries and four workshops, and the sanitary service possessed two evacuation points, three evacuation hospitals, 14 mobile surgical field hospitals, eight other hospitals, a medical reinforcement company, one motor and two horse-drawn ambulance companies, and a number of sanitary detachments. The veterinary service maintained two hospitals and two evacuation hospitals.[54]

Motor transport comprised of 156th, 257th, and 838th OATb, which in August 1944 had 142, 124, and 120 vehicles respectively, for a total of 386, of which 259 were operational. Antipenko states that in January 1945 the 8GA transport had 323 vehicles with a load of 700 tons. There is no information on the composition of the 8GA rear vehicle fleet for January 1945. However, the 7GA does have a complete inventory, a summary of which is shown in Table 11. [55] The rear possessed 1,226 vehicles, of which 188 were in the single OATb, which contained six GAZ-AA, 101 ZIS-5, 40 Chevrolets, and 11 Studebaker-type vehicles, for a capacity of 349 tons. An educated guess would put the 8GA rear at just over 1,500 vehicles.

As regards supplies on 1 January 1945, the 8GA had in it depots 0.5–1 boekomplekt (2,000t), 1.6–1.7 zapravki (900t), and 12–15 s/dacha (4,000t) and had a typical daily consumption of 775t (400t munitions, 105t fuel, and 270t food & fodder).[56] The course of the operation. The offensive opened on the 14 January from the Magnusnez and Pulawy bridgeheads with the breakthrough stage lasting until the 17th (D+1 to D+4), advancing to a depth of 100 km and covering 25 km a day.

The initial exploitation stage ran from 18 until 24 January (D +5 to D+12), with an advance to 230 km or 33 km a day and a further exploitation stage from 25 January to 2 February (D+13 to D+21) reaching out to 550 km or 30 km a day. The other side of the coin was that the OATb, which normally covered 150 km a day and had achieved double that during the summer of 1944, were hampered by the snow and ice and barely made 100 km a day. As such, they struggled to keep up with the combinedarms armies, let alone the tank armies, which were traveling up to 80 km day. Under these conditions, there was a real chance of the offensive grinding to a halt once 8GA exhausted the supplies it carried after reaching Lodz.

However, several factors conspired to maintain the advance, and these arose from a combination of the rapid advance and the complete collapse of the German 9. Armee. The principal result of these factors was that the railways were captured almost entirely intact, complete with 380 engines and 15,000 wagons (enough for 500 trains), albeit without signaling. This allowed the rear units to start a railway service between the Pulawy bridgehead and the front line by driving the supplies from the army base, across the pontoon bridges, and up to the railway line to be loaded onto makeshift trains. They even managed to fabricate tanker wagons by placing oil storage tanks onto flat-bed wagons, and this allowed a daily service of 18 trains (315t load) shuttling as far as Posen from D+4. Also, local services were started by the armies, which could control the branch lines more effectively than when under front control.

Secondly, the demand was low, as the troops captured large stocks of food and fodder, and there was little fighting with little ammunition expended. This effort was aided by the early opening of the Deblin bridge on 23 January (D+9) after eight days of construction rather than the expected 18 days, and this allowed through traffic of 8–10 trains a day comprising 30–40 wagons (6–- 8,000t) on the southern route from Deblin to Posen. This was just as well, as by D+10 the planned advance of 150 km had actually reached 300 km and was now outside Posen with the town being besieged. This was the start of real supply shortages, as the trains could not proceed past the town, and 8GA OATb could only deliver 350t up to 120 km away.

Throughout the course of the offensive, army OATb only delivered 38 percent of the supplies; the troop’s avtorota delivered 42 percent, and the front transport contributed 20 percent.57 A week later (D+16), the planned advanced of 240 km had now reached 450 km on the far side of Posen, and the front 2nd echelon command post had shifted forward and had established a handful of hospitals and two small artillery, fuel, and rations depots around Kutno and Lodz.

The heavily damaged double-tracked line between Warsaw and Posen, the ‘northern route’, should have become operational on this day with the completion of the Warsaw bridge. Instead, STAVKA ordered that the track be changed to Union gauge, which delayed the line coming into service until 15 Febuary (D+33), especially as the railway troops had to deal with unfamiliar standards of railway construction.

In reality, sufficient supplies were flowing along the southern route as far as Posen; it was the ‘tyranny of distance’ that was causing shortages at the front line. Front transport hauling munitions from Warsaw were now making a round trip of 10–12 days, and with every effort being made to increase the size of the transport fleet, the breakthrough artillery regiments were stripped of 500 lorries.

At this point on D+18, a bypass route was discovered around Posen using a small single-track line running to Kustrin, and 30 trains a day were sent off in this direction. However, progress was slowed by a lack of coaling and water stations, and the first few trains only arrived on D+24. At this point, divisional stocks had fallen as low as 0.3–0.5 zapravki and 0.5 boekomplekt or (only) enough for one to two days of operations, especially as heavy fighting broke out at the Kustrin bridgehead on D+21.

Conclusion

Sbornik № 20 rear in offensive

Published in October 1945, Sborniki № 2058 summarized the experience of logistics during the war and illustrated this with examples such as 1st Guards Army in February 1943, 12th Army in September 1943, 1st Belorussian Front in June 1944, and 1st Ukrainian Front in January 1945, when these units had operated more than 300 km away from railways. Yet these were the exceptions, and the authors immediately stressed the need for rapid reconstruction of railways; the desirability of positioning pre-offensive supplies as far forward as possible, often only 20 km from the front line; and the parlous state of the army transport battalions, which demanded both a sequenced approach and assistance from the troops’ avtorota and front transport brigades.

Yet the passage of time and historiography have dulled these sensible conclusions. Neither the growth in the size of the motor vehicle fleet, which was matched by an increasing number of guns and weight of munitions, nor the improved vehicles of Lend-Lease, which were only seen in small numbers in combined-arms armies (in February 1945, 7GA possessed just 279 Studebakers, almost all of which replaced existing artillery tractors), are sufficient to explain the increased mobility of combined-arms armies in the third period. If anything, the rifle division’s peshkom and frontovik benefited most from a growing number of horses to help them sustain their 30 km a day marches and pull their anti-tank guns, divisional guns, and peasant wagons. In reality, it was the ability of the railway engineers and NKPS to get the railways running again and to extract the maximum capacity from minor or damaged tracks that advanced the combined-arms armies beyond their 150-km limit, as was ably shown during the Vistula-Oder operation.

Ultimately, the three tyrannies of distance, demand, and weight were overcome by a thorough understanding of the limitations they imposed and the implementation of measures to combat them, something at which the Red Army excelled, with its soldiers accessing the resources of the landscape through which they marched, carrying the bare minimum of weapons, equipment, and stores and tailoring their operations to the possible.

This model established 10-day army operations, using three to four boekomplekt (with 1.5–2 used in the breakthrough and 0.2 used per day during the exploitation), two zapravki (0.2 per day), and 10 s/dacha (one per day) with an advance of 15 km a day or 150 km penetration. This was based on stocks built up behind the front line before the offensive, using all available transport and then advanced forward on the combat troops wagons or carried forward from the exchange points by avtorota. Beyond 75 km the troops advanced as an expedition, relying on what they carried themselves, as motor transport could no longer maintain full supply until the railway unloading stations caught up.[59]

This tightly controlled system, successfully mixing horse-drawn, motor, and rail transport, represented a unique approach compared to the German laissez-faire method, or the Western allies’ abundance of resources, and deserves recognition as such.

Soviet troops entering Harbin

  1. R. L. Garthoff, How Russia Makes War: Soviet Military Doctrine (London, UK: G. Allen & Unwin 1954) p. 287; For Stalin’s development of the concept of the Rear, see J. J. Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Roots of the Soviet Warfare State (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1994).

  2. I. Maliugin, ‘Razvitie i sovershenstvovanie tyla strelkovoĭ divizii v gody voĭny’ [Development and Improvement of the Rear of the Rifle Division During the War Years], Военно-исторический журнал (VIZh) [Military History Journal] 11 (1978) pp. 87–94.

  3. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR [Department for the Study of the Experience of War of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR], ‘Sbornik Materialov Po Izucheniiu Opyta Voĭny’ [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], 26 vols, 1942, https://shop.eastview. com/results/item?sku=CB0000029.

  4. Ot Voenno-Istoricheskogo Upravleniia General’nogo Shtaba VC [Military Historical Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR], ‘Sbornik Voenno-Istoricheskikh Materialov Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ Voĭny’ [Collection of Military-Historical Materials of the Great Patriotic War], 1949, https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku= CB0000082.

  5. A. D. Efremov, V. V. Mukhin, and N. G. Andronikov, Russkiĭ Arkhiv: Velikai͡a Otechestvennai͡a. Tyl Krasnoĭ Armii v VOV 1941–1945 gg. Tom 25(14) [Russian Archive: Great Patriotic War. The Rear of the Red Army 1941–1945. Vol. 25(14)] (Терра 1998).

  6. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, ‘Polozhenie Ob Organizatsii i Rabote Armeĭskogo Tyla (Proekt)’ [Regulations on the Organization and Operation of the Rear of the Army (the Project)], in Sbornik Materialov Po Izuchenii͡u Opyta Voĭny [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. 2, 1942, https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600056.

  7. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, ‘Polozhenie Ob Organizatsii i Rabote Frontovogo Tyla’ [Regulations on the Organization and Operation of the Front Rear], in Сборник Материалов По Изучению Опыта Войны [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. 4, 1943, https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600058

  8. 1.2.‘Skhema Obshcheĭ Organizatsii Divizionnogo Tyla’ [Scheme of the Common Organization of the Divisional Rear] (Pamyat Naroda, March 1943), f.202 op.0000005 d.1128 l.395, Arkhiv TsAMO, [Central Archive Ministry of Defence Russian Federation] https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=260929904

  9. 1.6.‘Shtat № 04/559 otdel noĭ avtoroty podvoza strelkovoĭ divizii (voennogo vremeni)’ [Establishment No 04/559 Separate Motor Transport Company Rifle Division (Operational Army)] (Pamyat Naroda: Poisk dokumentov chasteĭ), 559, f.214 op.1437 d.519, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=262168521 (accessed 22 August 2019)

  10. During the war, the Rear administrative command had a variety of different titles: 2nd Echelon Headquarters, 2nd Echelon Management, Rear Echelon Management, Rear Management Group.

  11. H. S. Orenstein, Soviet Documents on the Use of War Experience: Volume Three: Military Operations 1941 and 1942 (vol. 5, Sbornik Materialov Po Izucheniiu Opyta Voĭny [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War]) (Routledge, 2013)

  12. A. Ė. Serdiukov and V. A. Zolotarev, Velikai͡a Otechestvennai͡a Voĭna 1941–1945 Godov : V Dvenadt͡sati Tomakh [The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 in 12 Volumes] (Moskva: Voennoe Izd-vo 2011) p. 8. In Soviet historiography the war is divided into three periods, the first from 22 June 1941 to November 1942, the second from November 1942 to December 1943, and the third from January 1944 to 9 May 1945.

  13. A. D. Efremov, V. V. Mukhin, and N. G. Andronikov, Russkiĭ Arkhiv. sec 262: Report on the Organization of the Rear of the 51st Army — 4th Ukrainian Front (12–23 October 1943) paragraph 5

  14. 14‘Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, Rabota Armeĭskogo Tyla v Period Podgotovki Nastupatel noĭ Operatsii’ [The Work of the Army Rear During the Preparation of the Offensive Operation], in Сборник Материалов По Изучению Опыта Войны [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. 7, 1943, https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600061.

  15. S. I. Moiseyev, ‘Organizatsiya tylovogo obespecheniya voysk Krasnoy Armii v Stalingradskoy bitve’ [The Organization of Rear Support of the Red Army Troops in the Battle of Stalingrad], 2016, https://www.docme.ru/ doc/1396291/%C2%ABorganizaciya-tylovogo-obespecheniya-vojsk-krasnoj-armii-v-s

  16. Polkovnik I. Maliugin, ‘Razvitie i sovershenstvovanie tyla strelkovoĭ divizii v gody voĭny’ [Development and Improvement of the Rear of the Rifle Division During the War Years]

  17. ‘Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, Sbornik Materialov Po Izucheniiu Opyta Voĭny’ [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. 9, 1943, https://shop. eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600063

  18. Polkovnik I. Maliugin, ‘Tyl Voronezhskogo fronta v Belgorodsko-Хar kovskoĭ operatsii’ [Rear of the Operational Front During the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation], Voenno-istoricheskiĭ zhurnal [Military History Journal] 8 (1976) p. 30.

  19. Mayerhofer and Kammeradschaftehemaliges Grenadier-Regiment 315, 167.Infanterie-Division, Geschichte Des Grenadier-Regiments 315 Der Bayerischen 167. I.D. Almhutten Division, 1939–1944 (Munchen: Schild-Buch Dienst 1977) pp. 340–375

  20. ‘Belgorodsko-Хar kovskaia operatsiia 7 Gv. A’ [Map Showing Course of the Belgorod-Kharkov Operation by 7th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 3 August 1943), fond 341, opus 5312, delo 529, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113714056.

  21. A. D. Efremov, V. V. Mukhin, and N. G. Andronikov, Russian Archiv, sec. 239

  22. ‘Operativnoe Orientirovanie v Tylovoĭ Obstanovke Voĭsk 7 Gv. A’ [Operational Orientation Report on the Rear of the Troops of the 7th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 5 August 1943), fond 341, opus 5312, delo 243, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390160.

  23. ‘Grafik Boevogo Sostava 7 Gv. A’ [Chart of 7th Guards Army Combat Establishment] (Pamyat Naroda, 3 August 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 290, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=132344464.

  24. ‘Uchetnaia Kartochka o Chislennom i Boevom Sostave Chasteĭ 7 Gv. A’ [Registration Card on the Number and Type of Combat Units in 7th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 3 August 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 237, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133373349.

  25. ‘Vedomost Dislokatsii Tylovykh Chasteĭ i Uchrezhdeniĭ 7 Gv. A’ [Statement of the Location of Rear Units of the 7th Guards. Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 20 July 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 243, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda. ru/documents/view/?id=133390128.

  26. Manevrirovanie Transportnymi Sredstvami’ [Maneuvering the Means of Transport — Kharkov-Belgorod Operation], 5 August 1943, fond 341, opus 5312, delo 280, Dokument 1067, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/docu ments/view/?id=133390875

  27. ‘Spravka Ob Ukomplektovannosti Tylovykh Chasteĭ i Uchrezhdeniĭ 7 Gv. A’ [Statement About Staffing Rear Units and Establishments 7 Guards. Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 22 December 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 197, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=131308953.

  28. Vedomost Nalichiia i Tekhnicheskogo Sostoianiia Avtotransporta v 7 Gv. A’ [Statement of Numbers and Condition of Vehicles of the 7 Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 15 May 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 243 l 22, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390070.

  29. ‘Material o Rabote Avtootdela i Ego Chasteĭ Pri Provedenii Operatsii 1943 Goda’ [Material on the Work of the Motor Transport and Its Units During the Operation of 1943] (Pamyat Naroda, 3 August 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 280, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390885.

  30. ‘Raschet Potrebnosti Avtotransporta Dlia Perevozki’ [Calculation of the Need for Vehicles for Transportation] (Pamyat Naroda, 4 June 1943), fond 341, opus 5312, delo 243, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/docu ments/view/?id=133390095.

  31. ‘Manevrirovanie Transportnymi Sredstvami’ [Maneuvering the Means of Transport — Kharkov-Belgorod Operation].

  32. ‘Raschet Potrebnosti Avtotransporta Dlia Perevozki’ [Calculation of the Need for Vehicles for Transportation].

  33. ‘Raschet Vesa Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Sutochnoĭ Dachi Prodfurazha i Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Zapravki GSM 7 Gv. A’ [Calculation of Army’s One Day of Food and One Refuelling 7 Guards Army], 2 August 1943, fond 341 opus 5312 delo 280 l.1071, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390876.

  34. ‘Raschet Vesa Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Sutochnoĭ Dachi Prodfurazha i Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Zapravki GSM 7 Gv. A’ [Calculation of the Weight of One Daily Supply of Food and Fuel for 7 Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 10 September 1943), fond 41 opus 5312 delo 280, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390877.

  35. ‘Raschet Vesa Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Sutochnoĭ Dachi Prodfurazha i Odnoĭ Armeĭskoĭ Zapravki GSM 7 Gv. A’ [Calculation of Army’s One Day of Food and One Refuelling 7 Guards Army].

  36. ‘Operativnoe Orientirovanie v Tylovoĭ Obstanovke Voĭsk 7 Gv. A’ [Operational Orientation Report on the Rear of the Troops of the 7th Guards Army]

  37. ‘Skhema Ustroĭstva Tyla i Bazirovanie 7 Gv. A’ [Scheme of the Rear Units and Bases of 7th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 8 August 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 280, Archiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/? id=133390870.

  38. ‘Operativnoe Orientirovanie v Tylovoĭ Obstanovke Voĭsk 7 Gv. A’ [Operational Orientation Report on the Rear of the Troops of the 7th Guards Army].

  39. ‘Ustroĭstvo Tyla 7 Gv. A’ [Department of the Rear of 7th Guards Army], 3 August 1943, fond 341 opus 5312 delo 280, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390869.

  40. ‘Manevrirovanie Transportnymi Sredstvami’ [Maneuvering the Means of Transport — Kharkov-Belgorod Operation]

  41. ‘Rabochaia Karta Nachal nika Shtaba 7 Gv. A s 15.8.43’ [Work Sheet of the Chief of Staff of 7th Guards Army from 15.8.43] (Pamyat Naroda, 15 August 1943), fond 341 opus 5312 delo 417 l. 100230986_M, Arkhiv TsAMO, https:// pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=100230986

  42. ‘Skhema Ustroĭstva Tyla i Bazirovanie 7 Gv. A’ [Scheme of the Rear Units and Bases of 7th Guards Army]’.

  43. ‘Rabochaia Karta Nachal’nika Shtaba 7 Gv. A s 15.8.43’ [Work Sheet of the Chief of Staff of 7th Guards Army from 15.8.43].

  44. ‘Svodka Material nogo Obespecheniia Chasteĭ i Soedineniĭ 7 Gv. A’ [Summary of Material Supply of Units of 7th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 1 August 1943), fond 341, opus 5312, delo 243, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyatnaroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133390147.

  45. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, ‘6. Material noTekhnicheskoe Obespechenie Visla-Oderskoia Operatsii’ [6. Material-Technical Supply During the Oder-Vistula Operation], in Sbornik Materialov Po Izuchenii͡u Opyta Voĭny [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War], vol. 25, 1947, https://shop.eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600080.

  46. V. I. Filonov and M. A. Vilinov, ‘Stranitsy Istorii. Tylovoe obespechenie voĭsk v Vislo-Oderskoĭ strategicheskoĭ nastupatel noĭ operatsii’ [Pages of History: Rear Support of Troops in the Vistula-Oder Strategic Offensive Operation], Voennaia mysl’ [Military Thought] (K 60-letiiu Pobedy v Velikoĭ Otechestvennoĭ voĭne) 2 (2005) pp. 62–69. Gives alternate figures of 3,749 Front and 4,407 Army transport vehicles with a capacity of 14,864 tonnes and Divisional transport of 3,019 (5,874 tonnes).

  47. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, ‘6. Material noTekhnicheskoe Obespechenie Visla-Oderskoia Operatsii’ [6. Material-Technical Supply During the Oder-Vistula Operation]

  48. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR.

  49. A. D. Efremov, V. V. Mukhin, and N. G. Andronikov,Russkiĭ Arkhiv, sec. 233.

  50. V. I. Filinov and M. A. Vilinov, ‘Stranitsy Istorii. Tylovoe obespechenie voĭsk v Vislo-Oderskoĭ strategicheskoĭ nastupatel noĭ operatsii’ [Pages of History. Rear Support of Troops in the Vistula-Oder Strategic Offensive Operation].

  51. ‘Boyevoy sostav i raspredeleniye sredstv usileniya 8 Gv. A’ [Combat Establishment and Distribution of Reserves of 8th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 10 January 1945), fond 345 opus 5487 delo 330, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyatnaroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133371725.

  52. ‘Vedomost boevogo sostava 8 Gv. A’ [Statement of Military Units 8th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 15 January 1945), fond 345 opus 5487 delo 366 l. image 207, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/docu ments/view/?id=133352658.

  53. ‘Svedeniia o Nalichii i Raskhode Boepripasov, Nalichii Deĭstvuiushcheĭ Matchasti, Tiagi i Avtotransporta, Obespechennosti GSM i Prodovol stviem v Artchastiakh 8 Gv. A’ [Information on the Presence and Consumption of Ammunition, the Availability of Operating Materiel, Traction and Vehicles, the Provision of Petroleum Products and Food in Artillery Units of 8th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 11 January 1945), fond 345, opus 5487, delo 330, l.102, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=133371706.

  54. ‘Dislokatsionnyĭ Spisok Tylovykh Chasteĭ i Uchrezhdeniĭ 8 Gv. А’ [Location of the Rear Units and Departments of 8th Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 6 December 1944), fond 345, opus 5487, delo 180, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyatnaroda.ru/documents/view/?id=113396667.

  55. Nalichiia i Tekhnicheskogo Sostoianiia Avtotransporta 7 Gv. A’ [The 7 Guards Army] (Pamyat Naroda, 10 February 1945), fond 341, opus 5312, delo 928, Arkhiv TsAMO, https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id= 133393423.

  56. N. Antipenko, Na glavnom napravlenii [In the Main Direction] (Moskva: Nauka 1967) p. 214.

  57. Upravlenie izucheniia opyta voĭny General nogo SHtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Soiuza SSR, ‘Sbornik Materialov Po Izucheniiu Opyta Voĭny [Collection of Materials for the Study of the Experience of War]’, vol. 20, 1945, https://shop. eastview.com/results/item?sku=B9600075.

  58. Ibid

  59. J. G Moore, ‘Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War’, Military Affairs 24(2) (1960) p. 58. Moore defines an ‘expedition’ as an army loading up its transport with supplies and marching without support from one railway line to another supporting railway line